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ACTIVE VERIFICATION AND VIGILANCE: A METHOD TO
AVOID CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHEN
PRESCRIBING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
By Michael C. Barnes and Stacey L. Sklaver*
INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 2009, tragic news broke that the King of Pop, Michael
Jackson, had died. Jackson had suffered a sudden and fatal cardiac arrest
due to a prescription-drug overdose.' Jackson's personal physician, Dr.
Conrad Murray, had prescribed the fatal medication dosage in an attempt
to relieve Jackson from an insomnia-ridden state.2 Subsequently, a jury
found Murray guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and he received the
maximum sentence of four years in prison.
Following Murray's sentencing on November 29, 2011, Los Angeles
District Attorney Steve Cooley signaled that, going forward, he would
continue to be aggressive in holding physicians' criminally liable for their
roles in patient deaths' resulting from prescribed controlled substances.'
* Michael C. Barnes is the managing attorney at DCBA Law & Policy. Stacey L. Sklaver is an associate
attorney at DCBA Law & Policy. The authors thank Stewart B. Leavitt, MA, PhD for his editing
contributions, and Raven Merlau for her research contributions.
1. Michael Jackson's Amended Death Certificate was released on July 7, 2009, by the State of California
listing the cause of death as acute propofol intoxication. See Alan Duke, Michael Jackson Dead at 50 after
Cardiac Arrest, CNN.coM (June 25, 2009), available at
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-25/entertainment/michael.jackson_1 marlon-jackson-entertainer-michael-
jackson-jermaine-jackson?s=PM:SHOWBIZ.
2. Sentencing Memorandum at 2, People v. Murray, (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2011, No. 073164) available
at http://ww2.lasuperiorcourt.org/hp/acpo5a55nwxlmc45 lmzkt55/1479942870.pdf.
3. Jury Instructions at 7, People v. Murray (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2011, No. 073164) available at
http://ww2.lasuperiorcourt.org/hp/acpo5a55nwxlmc4511mzkt55/1477575899.pdf; Sentencing
Memorandum, supra note 2, at 4.
4. Although the legal suggestions in this paper apply to all prescribers, the focus will be on physicians. See
Who Can Prescribe and Administer Rx in Washington State?, WASH. ST. DEP'T HEALTH (Aug. 2012), at
http://www.doh.wa.gov/portals/l/Documents/Pubs/690158.pdf (discussing which licensed professionals
can write prescriptions.).
5. Jennifer Medina, Doctor Is Guilty in Michael Jackson's Death, NY TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/us/doctor-found-guilty-in-michael-jacksons-death.html.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 802 (2006). The Controlled Substances Act defines "controlled substances" to mean
"drugs or other substances" as found in schedules I through V. These schedules contain drugs that have a
high potential for abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 812 (2006). Such drugs include diazepam (Valium), propofol
(Diprivan), hydrocodone (Vicodin), carisoprodol (Soma), oxycodone (OxyContin), oxycodone with
paracetamol/acetaminophen (Percocet, Tylox), propoxyphene (Darvon), hydromorphone (Dilaudid),
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Less than a year later, Cooley stayed true to his word.' On March 1, 2012,
Dr. Hsui-Ying "Lisa" Tseng was arrested.' Mr. Cooley charged Dr. Tseng
with second-degree murder for the deaths of three of her patients that had
suffered fatal overdoses of prescription medications that she had
prescribed.9 Although it is more common for physicians to face civil
liability, the homicide charges against doctors Murray and Tseng, and
against many physicians throughout the United States, demonstrate the
increasingly varied, yet severe, forms of legal liability that physicians may
face for improperly prescribing controlled substances."o
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC"), prescription drug abuse" in the United States is an epidemic"
that is gaining widespread recognition." Accompanying the rise in abuse is
a rise in the number of deaths associated with prescription drug
overdoses.' 4 In 2010, seven people died each day from prescription drug
overdoses in Florida alone." As a result, states understandably have
lorazepam (Atvan), midazolam (Versed), alprazolam (Xanax), morphine sulfate (MS Contin), and
meperidine (Demerol). This Article refers to prescription medications by their generic names.
7. See Hailey Branson-Potts, Doctor Accused of Murder in Overdoses Ignored Signs, Witness Says, L.A.
TIMES (June 6, 2012), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/06/local/la-me-0606-lisa-tseng-
20120606.
8. Press Release, Sandi Gibbons, L.A. Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Office, Rowland Heights Doctor Charged
with Murder in Patient Deaths (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
http://da.lacounty.gov/mr/archive/2012/030112a.htm.
9. Linda Deutsch & Greg Risling, Hsiu-Ying 'Lisa' Tseng, Calf Doctor, Charged with Murder in Patients'
Prescription Overdose Deaths, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/05/hsiu-ying-lisa-Tseng-murder-charge-unethical-doctor-n
1321161.html; see also The War on Pill Mills, AM. NEWS REPORT (Mar. 5, 2011), at
http://americannewsreport.com/the-war-on-pill-mills-8813413.
10. See Deutsch & Risling, supra note 9; The War on Pill Mills, supra note 9; see also Julia Dahl, Doctors
and Drugs: Is it Murder when a Patient ODs?, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12,2012), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57394532-504083/doctors-and-drugs-is-it-murder-when-a-
patient-ods (discussing a Florida physician who is charged with first-degree murder).
11. See National Prescription Drug Abuse Prevention Strategy, CTR. LAWFUL ACCESS & ABUSE
DETERRENCE, 7 (2010), available at http://claad.org/downloads/2010_National_Strategy.pdf "Prescription
Drug Abuse" is "the intentional self-administration of a medication for a nonmedical purpose such as
'getting high."' This definition "includes all degrees of medication use with the intention of experiencing a
high, from teens swallowing pills from medicine cabinets to inveterate addicts 'shooting' morphine. Abuse
and nonmedical use are synonymous" for the purpose of this Article. It includes all controlled substances,
whether they be benzodiazepines, stimulants, or opioids-both long and short acting.
12. See Glossary, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/about/terms/glossary.htm#e. The CDC defines "epidemic" as "[t]he
occurrence of more cases of disease than expected in a given area or among a specific group of people over
a particular period of time."
13. See Prescription Drug Overdoses-a U.S. Epidemic, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan.
13, 2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6l01a3.htm.
14. See id.
15. Lizette Alvarez, Florida Shutting 'Pill Mill' Clinics, NY TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/us/0 ldrugs.html?pagewanted=all.
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moved to interrupt the supply of prescription medications to drug
abusers. "
Although drug abusers may acquire prescription medications through
illicit channels, many others obtain prescriptions directly from
prescribers." Although at the fringe, some physicians operate pill mills,
acting as little more than drug dealers." However, the vast majority of
physicians prescribe controlled substances in good faith, legitimately
trying to manage patients' medical ailments, such as a chronic pain,
anxiety, or insomnia.19 Yet, states, such as Florida," are simultaneously
imposing stronger legal duties upon physicians and seeking criminal
sanctions against physicians who improperly prescribe controlled
substances.2'
Prior to the epidemic, many scholars and courts alike had opposed the
imposition of criminal liability on physicians for improper prescribing,
fearing that such liability would create a chilling effect: physicians would
refrain from properly treating patients who legitimately needed certain
prescription medications out of fear of criminal sanctions if a patient died
from an overdose.22 However, the issue for physicians is more nuanced
than just whether or not to prescribe controlled substances, and the belief
that that physicians should be held criminally liable when their patients die
from prescription drug overdoses, is gaining traction.2 3
16. See Deutsch & Risling, supra note 9; War on Pill Mills, supra note 9.
17. See War on Pill Mills, supra note 9.
18. See, e.g., Deonarine v. State, 967 So. 2d 333, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (convicting the defendant
physician of trafficking a controlled substance after he wrote multiple prescriptions in bad faith); Ashley
Dutko, Florida's Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse: Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 34
NOVA L. REv. 739, 744 (2010).
19. See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffman, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Calibrating the
Balance in our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 231, 277 (2008)
(stating that most courts will hear a good faith defense to charges resulting from a prescription overdose).
20. See H.R. 7095, 113th Cong. (2011). Florida House Bill No. 7095 requires physicians to actively verify
patients' suitability for the use of controlled substances and remain vigilant in ensuring controlled
substances continue to be appropriate for their patients, a model used by this article.
21. Id; see also Medscape Today News, State-by-State Opioid Prescribing Policies, available at
http://www.medscape.com/resource/opioid/opioid-policies.
22. See, e.g., Danielle M. Nunziato, Note, Preventing Prescription Drug Overdose in the Twenty-First
Century: Is the Controlled Substances Act Enough?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1269 (2009) ("Many
scholars oppose holding physicians criminally liable under the CSA or the state penal laws for the death of
a patient out of fear that this will discourage physicians from providing palliative treatment to patients
suffering from chronic pain."); James R. Blaufuss, A Painful Catch-22: Why Tort Liability for Inadequate
Pain Management Will Make for Bad Medicine, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2005).
23. Erica Trachtman, Note, A Horrific Violation of Trust: Prosecuting Doctors for Patients' Prescription
Overdoses, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Feb. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blog-entry/horrific-violation-trust-prosecuting-
doctors-patients%E2%80%99-prescription-overdoses-02-21 ("Despite opposition from the American
Medical Association that the tort system is sufficient for holding physicians accountable for negligently
prescribing medication, the Drug Enforcement Administration reports a steady rise in successful criminal
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When a patient'dies of a prescription drug overdose, the physician
may face legal actions ranging from civil liability to first-degree murder.24
As more prosecutors bring charges against physicians, these physicians
willing to prescribe controlled substances may not be able to accurately
predict when they could face criminal liability." Additionally, courts have
begun to reject long-standing defenses that physicians have used in the
past.26
Moreover, controlled substances are not appropriate for certain
patients, even when such patients have a legitimate medical need for the
medication, especially if the patients have previously abused or exhibit
signs that they are likely to abuse controlled substances. This article
establishes that physicians who prescribe controlled substances must, on a
case-by-case basis, actively verify that treatment via controlled substances
is an appropriate option for their patients, diligently ensure that the
patients remain suitable candidates after the physicians have prescribed
such medication, and willingly change the course of treatment if the
patients exhibit any signs of abuse-a method that this paper deems
"active verification and vigilance."27  This method, when thoroughly
documented in medical records, helps to satisfy physicians' duties under
civil law, the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"),28  state controlled
substances acts, and state homicide laws. 29 Therefore, to protect patients
from foreseeable harm and to make both civil liability and criminal
convictions less likely, physicians must adequately and diligently employ
the method of active verification and vigilance when prescribing
controlled substances.30
prosecutions of physicians, from just 15 convictions in 2003 to 43 in 2008.").
24. See infra Part IV.A-B.
25. See Frank L. Sapienza, Abuse Deterrent Formulations and the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 70
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE S23, S30 (2012) (stating that " . . . differentially scheduled products,
formulations and substances could also lead to confusion regarding appropriate criminal charges, penalties
and sentencing issues" in a discussion of the CSA).
26. See infra Parts IV, V and Table 1 (discussing the good faith, contributory negligence, calculated risk,
and willful ignorance defenses).
27. See Stewart B. Leavitt & Gary M. Reisfield, Introducing "Understanding UDT in Pain Care," PAIN
TREATMENT TOPICS (Aug. 27, 2012), available at
http://updates.pain-topics.org/2012/08/introducing-understanding-udt-in-pain.html?m=1. The concept of
"vigilance" in this article is based on the definition of pharmcovigilence, which is defined as the science
and activities related to the "detection, assessment, understanding, and prevention of adverse effects or
other problems related to medication prescribing and use" in order to "enhance the care and safety of
patients."
28. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006).
29. See infra Part III.
30. This article defines "active verification" as (1) verifying a patient's medical history, (2) checking
prescription monitoring program databases, (3) determining whether other treatments that did not involve
controlled substances were tried and failed by using drug tests before first prescribing, and (4) continuing to
ACTIVE VERIFICATIONAND VIGILANCE
This article serves as a guide to physicians3' and their legal counsel to
help them better determine when physicians can be held civilly and
criminally liable if their patients die from improperly using controlled
substances while under the physicians' care. It analyzes both civil and
criminal case law at both the state and federal levels, determines which
defenses are no longer viable, and makes recommendations as to what
steps physicians should take to avoid liability. Part I first explores the
problem of prescription drug abuse in the United States, and the resulting
increase in legal proceedings involving physicians. Part II provides an
overview of the medical standard of care, the CSA test as well as state
controlled substances act tests for criminal liability, and various homicide
doctrines. Part III establishes that physicians must, to the best of their
ability, actively verify patient suitability for controlled substances before
beginning treatment and must remain vigilant throughout the course of
treatment to better comply with legal requirements imposed by civil law,
the CSA, state controlled substances acts, and state homicide statutes. Part
IV discusses civil cases in which courts have held physicians liable for
their patients' deaths due to overdoses of controlled substances. Part V
discusses how physicians may be held criminally liable for failing to
actively verify patient suitability before beginning treatment and remain
vigilant throughout the course of treatment. It reviews federal and state
criminal cases in which courts have held physicians liable when improper
prescribing practices resulted in patient deaths. It highlights defenses on
which physicians may no longer rely, further emphasizing the need for
physicians to actively verify patient suitability for controlled substances
before beginning treatment and remain vigilant throughout the course of
treatment. This article concludes by asserting that, if physicians properly
adhere to the method of active verification and vigilance, they have a
better chance of providing adequate care for their patients and avoiding
civil and criminal liability at state and federal levels.
I. THE GROWING PROBLEM OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE
Whitney Houston, Michael Jackson, Heath Ledger, and Anna Nicole
Smith are just a few of the many modem-day celebrities whose
prescription drug-related deaths have highlighted the national problem of
test and monitor patients throughout their treatment to ensure the patients do not use the controlled
substance improperly.
31. This article addresses liability faced solely by physicians. However, physician extenders and other
practitioners may also be held liable if they practice on their own, and could still be required to defend
themselves even if they were acting under the direct supervision of physicians. This is an issue of agency
relationships, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
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prescription drug abuse.32 According to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, "prescription drug abuse is the fastest growing drug
problem in the United States."33 In 2010, approximately 16,651 people in
the United States died as result of unintentional overdoses involving
prescription opioid pain relievers.34
Several classes of prescription medications are prone to abuse." One
such class is the aforementioned opioid pain relievers. Since 2003, deaths
due to prescription opioid overdoses have outpaced deaths due to heroin
and cocaine overdoses combined." Prescription opioids include
hydrocodone, oxycodone, morphine, hydromorphone, and meperidine."
Physicians prescribe such medications because opioids can "effectively
change the way a person experiences pain," making the pain more
tolerable.39 Yet, opioids may also result in a heightened sense of pleasure,
making such medication prone to abuse.40
Central nervous system ("CNS") depressants are another class of
prescription medications that patients often abuse.4' CNS depressants are
sedatives that enhance the effect of gamma-aminobutyric acid in the brain,
subsequently slowing brain activity.4 2 CNS depressants include propofol,
barbiturates, and benzodiazepines, like alprazolam and diazepam.43
32. Nunziato, supra note 22 at 1262; Whitney Houston Dead: Officials Confirm Prescription Drugs Found
in Hotel Room, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/13/whitney-houston-death-prescription-drugs-found-hotel-room
n 1274533.html.
33. Prescription Drug Overdoses-a U.S. Epidemic, supra note 13.
34. Press Release, Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Opioids drive continued increase in drug
overdose deaths, (Feb. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0220_drug overdose deaths.html; See Stewart B. Leavitt, Drug
Overdose Deaths Still Rising in U.S., PAIN TREATMENT TOPiCS (Feb. 19, 2013), available at
http://updates.pain-topics.org/2013/02/drug-overdose-deaths-still-rising-in-us.html (stating that of those
16,651 deaths involving opioids, 4,903 were the result of opioid use alone and the rest of the deaths
involved a combination of opioids and alcohol, other prescription medications, or illicit drugs).
35. See Commonly Abused Drugs Chart, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/commonly-abused-drugs/commonly-abused-drugs-chart (stating
that classes prone to abuse include opioid pain relievers, stimulants, and CNS depressants).
36. See id.
37. Prescription Drug Overdoses-a U.S. Epidemic, supra note 13.
38. James Zacny, et al., College on Problems of Drug Dependence taskforce on prescription opioid non-
medical use and abuse: position statement, 69 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 215 (2003).
39. UT Dep't of Human Serv., Substance Abuse & Mental Health: Opioids, available at
http://www.dsamh.utah.gov/opioids.htm.
40. Prescription Drug Overdoses-a U.S. Epidemic, supra note 13.
41. Id.
42. Id
43. Id
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Abusers often mix CNS depressants with other prescription medications,
such as stimulants like amphetamines.4 4
A third class of highly-abused controlled substances is stimulants,
which includes methylphenidate, dextroamphetamine, and pemoline.
Individuals tend to abuse stimulants because doing so may result in many
of the same euphoric effects as cocaine.4 5 Yet, stimulants also have other
negative effects. High doses of stimulants can lead to an increased risk of
addiction, cardiovascular complications, increased blood pressure,
headaches, panic episodes, aggressive behavior, suicidal or homicidal
tendencies, and overdose-related deaths. 46
When a physician improperly prescribes a controlled substance, he
can face professional responsibility, civil, and criminal legal proceedings.47
For example, the Osteopathic Medical Board of California alleged that Dr.
Lisa Tseng improperly prescribed drugs to a number of patients,
eventually leading to Dr. Tseng's voluntary surrender of her license.48 Dr.
Tseng also settled civil suits for the wrongful deaths of five of her patients
who died of prescription drug overdoses.4 9 Soon after, Los Angeles County
District Attorney Steve Cooley brought second-degree murder charges
against Dr. Tseng.so
Criminal charges are becoming more frequent as states attempt to
crack down on so-called pill mills and the rogue prescribers who operate
out of them. Pam Bondi, Florida's Attorney General, describes such
physicians as "drug dealers in white coats.""1 As states enact tougher laws
to deter improper prescribing, physicians who legitimately prescribe
44. Id.
45. Barbara Prudhomme White, et al., Stimulant Medication Use, Misuse, and Abuse in an Undergraduate
and Graduate Student Sample, 54 J. AM. COLL. HEALTH 261 (2006).
46. Id
47. Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 285, 287-88 (2010); see also Amy J. Dilcher, Damned if They Do, Damned if They
Don't: The Need for a Comprehensive Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of Pain, 13
ANNALS HEALTH L. 81, 92 (2004) ("[T]he number of DEA actions against health care providers is
increasing."); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cases Against Doctors (Mar. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/crimadmin-actions/doctorscriminal cases.pdf.
48. Gibbons, supra note 8; see also Linda Deutsch, Dr. Hsui-Ying 'Lisa' Tseng, Cahfornia Doctor
Charged With Murder of 3 Patients, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/01/dr-hsui-ying-lisa-tseng-arrested-n1314934.html.
49. Miriam Hernandez, Dr. Lisa Tseng Prescribes Meds to Undercover Agent-Caught on Tape, ABC
LOCAL (June 21, 2012), available at
http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/local/losangeles&id=8710399.
50. Linda Deutsch, Dr. Hsui-Ying 'Lisa' Tseng Dubbed 'Doctor Feelgood' During Murder Investigation,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/dr-hsui-ying-lisa-tseng-doctor-feelgood-n_1316262.html.
51. Alvarez, supra note 15.
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controlled substances face greater scrutiny and risk of civil and criminal
liability.52 They must know and abide by the proper standards of care.
II. THE MEDICAL STANDARD OF CARE, THE ANALOGOUS
CSA STANDARD, AND HOMICIDE DOCTRINES
When prescribing medications, physicians have a legal duty to abide
by the medical standard of care or face liability for breaching such
standard.5 3 Courts use various tests to determine the medical standard of
care.54 Additionally, the CSA imposes a criminal duty on physicians that
draws from the medical standard of care, and all states have their own
controlled substances acts, which are typically modeled after the CSA."
This Part provides an overview of the standard of care and physicians'
duties under the CSA and under state laws.
A. Tests for the Medical Standard of Care in Civil Cases
Courts rely on a medical standard of care in medical malpractice
cases to determine physicians' legal duties to their patients.56 Although
there is no widely accepted definition for the standard of care that governs
the medical community, state courts tend to use one of two tests to
determine the standard: the "medical customs" test and the "reasonable,
prudent physician" test." Courts that apply the medical customs standard
of care evaluate a defendant physician's conduct by comparing such
conduct with that of his peers in the medical community.58 The party
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 893.055(9) (2012) (stating that prescribers face a first-degree misdemeanor
offense if they "willfully and knowingly fail to report the dispensing of a controlled substance"); see also
Scott Wartman, Pill Mill Bill is Affecting Legitimate Patients, Doctors Say, CINNCINATI.COM, (Aug. 10,
2012), available at
http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20120813/NEWSO 103/308130009/Pill-mill-bill-affecting-legitimate-
patients-doctors-say.
53. See, e.g., Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History and Definitions: the
Bad and Good News, 12 W. J. EMERG. MED. 109, 109-12 (2011).
54. Id. The duty of care is one element of the medical malpractice test, which is a type of professional
negligence. The four elements include the following: (1) the physician owed a legal duty to the patient by
undertaking care or treatment of the patient; (2) the physician breached his duty to the patient by failing to
conform to the relevant standard of care; (3) the breach caused an injury; and (4) the patient suffered
damage. See Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1971).
55. See infra Part IIB; see also Richard L. Braun, Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1990, 13
CAMPBELL L. REv. 365, 365 (1991).
56. Dirk C. Strauss & J. Meirion Thomas, What Does the Medical Profession Mean by "Standard of
Care? ", 27 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY e192, e193 (2009); Robert I. Simon, The Standard-of-Care Testimony,
Best Practices or Reasonable Care?, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 8 (2005), available at
http://www.jaapl.org/content/33/l/8.full.
57. Id.
58. Id.; Simon, supra note 56.
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seeking to establish a customary practice in court typically does so by
presenting evidence in the form of expert testimony."
According to the Supreme Court decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc.,so a proponent presenting expert testimony must
prove that the expert has scientific knowledge and that such knowledge is
valid.6' Courts determine validity by considering various factors.62 Such
factors include whether:
1. Scientists have tested the theory or technique and deemed it
valid;
2. Peers have reviewed the idea or it has been published in
scientific journals;
3. The relevant scientific community has generally accepted
the theory or technique as valid; and
4. Standards have been circulated, usually in the form of
consensus statements or clinical guidelines, to govern the
operation of the technique and the known or potential rate of
error involved in the technique.63
The factors focus on methodology and principles rather than simply
the ultimate conclusions generated.'
However, many other courts throughout the United States have
expressly rejected deference to medical customs, refraining the medical
standard of care in terms of the "reasonable, prudent physician" test." In
fact, the courts of at least twenty-one states have applied a form of the
59. See, e.g., Raines v. Lutz, 341 S.E.2d 194, 196 (Va. 1986) (holding that expert testimony is normally
required on the standard of care, deviation from standard of care, and causation); Walski v. Tiesenga, 72 Ill.
2d 249, 256 (1978) (holding that the plaintiff must establish the standard of care for medical malpractice
through an expert witness).
60. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
61. Id. at 589.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Strauss, supra note 56, at e193.
65. See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163, 164 (2000) (noting that twelve states have expressly rejected
giving deference to medical customs, and nine more states have rephrased their standard of care to address
the reasonable, prudent physician rather than customs in the medical community); Leonard J. Nelson III, et
al., Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 453 (2011) (noting the trend
toward replacing the traditional medical standard of care with the reasonable prudent physician standard of
care).
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reasonable, prudent physician test." The reasonable, prudent physician test
is not determined by the average physician. Even if 99 of 100 physicians
perform the same inadequate technique or ascribe to a certain theory, a
court can still find the physicians negligent if such technique or theory
caused harm to patients." Courts have held that negligence cannot be
excused just because other physicians use similar practices or the medical
community widely accepts such practice." As such, the reasonable,
prudent physician test is more stringent than the medical customs test,
focusing more on whether a physician's action or omission could cause the
patient harm, rather than customary acceptance." Therefore, physicians
must protect themselves by not only taking into account what is
customary, but also what any reasonable, prudent physician would do in a
like situation to prevent harm to a patient.
B. The CSA's and State Controlled Substances Acts' Criminal
Duties
Physicians must also adhere to standards and duties imposed by the
CSA and state controlled substances acts. In response to a growing illicit
drug problem in the U.S., Congress passed the CSA, which granted the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") authority to investigate
and prosecute prescribers." The Act created five schedules that classify
66. These states include California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g., Smethers v. Campion, 108 P.3d 946, 954 (2005); Darling v.
Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E. 2d 253, 257 (1965); Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So.
2d 544, 550 (1962); Peters, supra note 65, at 172-85.
67. Simon, supra note 56.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 738 (1932); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974);
Simon, supra note 56.
70. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 (Ill. 1993) (stating that the standard of
care is "the authority which a reasonably prudent person, exercising diligence and discretion, in view of the
principal's conduct, would naturally suppose the agent to possess."); McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892,
895 (N.C. 1982), stating:
[a] physician or surgeon who undertakes to render professional services must possess the
degree of professional learning, skill and ability which others similarly situated ordinarily
possess; he must exercise reasonable care and diligence in the application of his knowledge
and skill to the patient's case; and he must use his best judgment in the treatment and care of
his patient. . . . He is held to the standard of professional competence and care customary in
similar communities among physicians engaged in his field of practice.
Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (citing The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932))
(describing the reasonable, prudent physician test and stating that courts must set their own standards rather
than leaving it up to the medical community because "there are precautions so imperative that even their
universal disregard will not excuse their omission").
71. 21 U.S.C. § 878 (2006); 1970-1975, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., available at
http://www.justice.gov/dealabout/history/1 970-1975.pdf
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controlled substances based on considerations, such as degree of actual or
relative potential for abuse, scientific evidence of pharmacological effect,
public health risks, and psychic or physiological dependence liability.72
Schedule I contains substances that lack any accepted medical use in
treatment." Schedules II through V contains controlled substances that
state-licensed physicians may prescribe as long as they have registered
with the DEA to do so.74
The CSA also imposes upon physicians duties regarding receiving
and maintaining records of controlled substances, writing or faxing
prescriptions, providing refills, transferring a controlled substance to
another registered prescriber, providing proper security for storage of
controlled substances, and reporting and completing the proper paperwork
for theft or significant loss of controlled substances."
In addition to the CSA, each state has statutes that regulate
physicians' ability to prescribe controlled substances. Such statutes
typically fall under the states' own controlled substances act, which are
usually modeled after the CSA.n State statutes can impose additional
duties on physicians who prescribe controlled substances." Thus,
physicians must also be aware of the controlled substances act that applies
in their state.
Federal courts applying the CSA and many state courts applying their
own controlled substances acts determine criminal liability based on a
three-step test. The court must determine whether (1) the physician
knowingly and intentionally furnished a prescription for a controlled
substance; (2) the physician's behavior serves a "legitimate medical
purpose;" and (3) the physician acts within "the usual course of medical
practice."79
72. 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (2006).
73. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006).
74. Id.; U.S. Dep't Justice, Practitioner's Manual, Section II-General Requirements, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.: OFF. DIVERSION CONTROL (2006), available at
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/section2.htm.
75. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.71(a); U.S. Dep't Justice, Practitioner's Manual, An Informational Outline of the
Controlled Substances Act, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.: OFF. DIVERSION CONTROL (2006),
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/index.html.
76. Braun, supra note 55.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006); State v. Moody, 393 So. 2d 1212, 1214-5 (La. 1981); United
States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 196-7 (1975) (holding that the phrases "in the usual course of
professional practice" and "legitimate medical purpose" have the same meaning); see also United States v.
Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 141-2 (1975); see also Deborah Hellman, Pushing Drugs or Pushing the Envelope:
The Prosecution of Doctors in Connection with Over-Prescribing Opium-Based Drugs, 28 PHIL. & PUB.
POL'Y Q. 7 (2008), available at
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Physicians can meet these duties under CSA by abiding by the
medical standard of care.so Although the CSA test is used for criminal
liability, it is consistent with the medical standard of care, and courts have
applied both the reasonable, prudent physician and medical customs tests
in CSA cases." For instance, in United States v. Alerre, the defendant
physicians faced criminal charges for drug distribution, drug conspiracy,
and money-laundering.82 The lower court had allowed an expert physician
to testify that the defendants had issued prescriptions that were
"inconsistent with the dosages that a prudent physician in the state of
South Carolina would give [under] the standard of care."" The lower court
permitted the jury to consider but not necessarily convict based on what a
"reasonable physician would have done," i.e., the same civil test used for
the medical standard of care.84 The appellate court upheld the lower court's
decision to permit the jury to consider the medical standard of care." It
stated that a showing of breach of the medical standard of care-a civil
standard-is relevant to establish that the physician breached his duties to
the patient under criminal law as long as the jury was also properly
instructed on the criminal standard for liability."
Similarly, in United States v. Chube," the Fourth Circuit upheld the
lower court's convictions of Dr. Randall Chube and Dr. David Demaret
Chube II for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, which the
physicians argued that they used to treat their patients' chronic pain." The
circuit court noted that the government was required to show that the
defendant "knowingly and intentionally acted 'outside the course of
professional practice' and without 'a legitimate medical purpose.""' The
court further stated that it was "impossible sensibly to discuss the question
of whether a physician was acting outside the usual course of professional
practice without a legitimate medical purpose without mentioning the
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1801 &context-fac pubs. Please
note that while many of these cases also list "acting in good faith" as an additional element, this Article
shows that physicians can no longer rely upon "good faith," as discussed below.
80. See supra Part II.A.
81. See United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 686 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132,
1137 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the lower court confused the reasonable, prudent physician standard with
the legitimate medical purpose standard when advising an expert on the witness stand, yet ultimately
holding that the lower court's definition of the criminal standard was correct).
82. Id. at 684.
83. Id. at 686.
84. Id. at 687.
85. Id. at 691.
86. Id.
87. U.S. v. Chube II, 538 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2008).
88. Id. at 694.
89. Id at 695.
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usual [medical] standard of care."90 Thus, the medical standard of care and
the CSA test often contain the same requirements, and a physician can
meet his duties to his patients under the CSA by complying with the
medical standard of care.
C. Homicide Doctrines
When a patient dies due to a prescription drug-related overdose,
prosecutors can choose to charge the physician and apply state homicide
laws. Although some courts have been reluctant to find physicians
criminally liable for breaching the standard of care due to such physicians'
benign motives in inflicting injury on patients," many other courts are less
apprehensive when such breach results in a patient's death. 92When
physicians violate the CSA or state law regulating controlled substances,
state medical boards typically suspend physicians' medical licenses
temporarily or place physicians on probation." However, if a physician is
convicted under a state homicide statute, his license can be permanently
revoked, making such charge a more enticing option for prosecutors
aiming to deter improper prescribing in particularly egregious cases.94
Some prosecutors, in states such as California, have charged
physicians with involuntary manslaughter and second-degree murder.9 5
Other prosecutors, in states such as Georgia, have charged physicians with
felony-murder.9 6 Florida prosecutors have gone so far as to charge
physicians with first-degree murder.97 Given that the distinctions between
these legal doctrines are so nuanced, it is helpful to provide a quick and
simplified overview. This section will use California terminology to
discuss involuntary manslaughter and second-degree murder, Georgia
terminology to discuss felony-murder, and Florida terminology to discuss
90. Id. at 698.
91. Leonard J. Nelson III, Helling v. Carey, Revisited: Physician Liability in the Age of Managed Care, 25
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777, 785 (2002).
92. See infra, Part III; see also Laura D. Seng, Legal and Regulatory Barriers to Adequate Pain Control
for Elders in Long-Term Care Facilities, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 95, 101 (2003) (stating that "criminal
prosecution[s] of physicians are unfortunately a necessary evil" in a discussion of prescription drug abuse).
93. Trachtman, supra note 23.
94. States have the power to revoke physicians' licenses to practice medicine if the physicians have been
found guilty of improper or unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Younge v. State Bd. of Registration for Healing
Arts, 451 S.W.2d 346, 347 (Mo. 1969). The purpose of such action is to protect the public rather than to
punish the physician. Id. One study found that 69% of physicians convicted of murder, manslaughter, or
involuntary manslaughter convictions had their licenses revoked. Paul Jung, et al., US. Physicians
Disciplined for Criminal Activity, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 335, 349 (2006).
95. See infra Part V.B.
96. Id.
97. Id
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first-degree murder. Each of these states-California, Georgia, and
Florida-have adjudicated cases against physicians using these criminal
doctrines respectively, as discussed below."
1. Involuntary Manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional, unlawful killing
committed without malice aforethought but committed with criminal
negligence.99 To be convicted of involuntary manslaughter, the defendant
must have either committed a killing "in the commission of an unlawful
act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and
circumspection."' 0 Criminal negligence is defined as the reckless or
grossly negligent commission of a highly dangerous act.'01 A person acts
with criminal negligence when he should be, but is not, aware of the
substantial and unjustifiable risk to human life.'o2 The conduct is such a
departure from the reasonable, prudent person's conduct under the same
circumstances that it shows "disregard of human life or an indifference to
consequences," thus establishing the objective, reasonable, prudent
physician standard in the criminal context.'
2. Second-Degree Murder
Second-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of first-degree
murder.'04 Case law defines second-degree murder as a murder that is
committed with malice aforethought.' A court will presume malice
aforethought exists if (1) an assailant deliberately performs an unlawful act
resulting in death, (2) the assailant knows that his conduct endangers the
life of another, and (3) the act is executed without provocation or sudden
passion.'
In order to act with malice, the defendant must have known that his
act threatened a life, but continued to act with conscious disregard of that
threat regardless of his knowledge.'o7 In other words, it requires a
98. Id.
99. People v. Anderson, 141 Cal. App. 4th 430, 432 (2006).
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West 2012).
101. See, e.g., People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 451 (Cal. 1998); see also People v. Breverman, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 870, 875 (1998).
102. Haaris Syed, Developments in California Homicide Law, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1371, 1443 (2003).
103. Id. at 1443-4.
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2012); see also People v. Castaneda, 51 Cal. 4th 1292, 1328 (2011).
105. People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015, 1077 (Cal. 2007).
106. People v. Lasko, 23 Cal. 4th 101, 107 (2000).
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2012).
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conscious disregard for life where the accused actually appreciated the risk
involved.
Malice may be express or implied.'" Express malice murder requires
an actual intent to kill.'09 According to the California Penal Code, second-
degree murder with implied malice requires the following:
(1) [The defendant] intentionally committed an act;
(2) The natural and probable consequences of the act were
dangerous to human life;
(3) At the time [the defendant] acted, [he] knew [his] act was
dangerous to human life; and
(4) [He] deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
[human] life."o
Therefore, a state court will find a physician guilty of second-degree
murder for knowingly and intentionally committing an act dangerous to
human life where the physician appreciated the risk."'
There is a subtle distinction between second-degree murder with
implied malice and involuntary manslaughter. Second-degree murder with
implied malice requires the defendant to actually realize the risk to human
life created by the conduct and to act with conscious disregard.1'12
Involuntary manslaughter requires that the defendant's conduct endanger a
life, but the defendant does not objectively realize the risk and acts without
conscious disregard."' In other words, unlike criminal negligence, which
is determined by the objective standard of the reasonable person, second-
degree murder with implied malice requires a determination that the
accused was aware of the risk to life that his actions created and
consciously disregarded that risk."14
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 2012).
109. People v. Gonzalez, 278 P.3d 1242, 1251 (Cal. 2012).
110. CALCRIM § 520 (2012).
111. People v. Nieto Benitez, 840 P.2d 969, 975 (Cal. 1992).
112. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (2012) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (2012).
113. CALCRIM § 580 (2012) (California criminal jury instructions).
114. Id.
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3. First-Degree Murder; Felony-Murder
First-degree murder is defined as (1) the unlawful killing of a human
being with premeditation or (2) felony-murder."'5 Felony-murder occurs
when, in the commission of a felony, the defendant causes the death of
another human being irrespective of malice."' In some states, defendants
can only be charged with felony-murder if they commit certain, specific
felonies."' However, in Georgia, a defendant can be charged for felony-
murder for any felony resulting in death if the felony is dangerous per se,
or if the felony creates a foreseeable risk of death by attendant
circumstances."' The prosecutor must show a direct, causal connection
between the commission of the felony and the death."9 The court will not
find that legal cause existed if (1) a coincidence occurs that was not
reasonably foreseeable; or (2) an abnormal response occurs. 20 Although
the defendant need not act with malice or intent to kill another human
being, he must possess the criminal intent to commit the underlying
felony."' The sentence for felony-murder in Georgia is life imprisonment
or death.'22
III. THE METHOD OF ACTIVE VERIFICATION AND
VIGILANCE
Controlled substance prescribers should actively verify patient
suitability for treatment before beginning such treatment and remain
vigilant throughout the course of treatment to help meet their legal duty
under civil law, the CSA, and state homicide laws.'23 By taking and
properly documenting steps to comply with this method, physicians can
significantly improve their likelihood of satisfying the medical standard of
care and of avoiding homicide charges in the event of a patient overdose.
This Part discusses the steps that physicians can take to satisfy this method
115. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (2012).
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (2012).
117. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5402,
21-2515 (2012); VA. CODE § 18.2-32 (2012).
118. Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 602, 603 (1992).
119. See State v. Crane, 279 S.E.2d 695, 696 (Ga. 1981) (refusing to hold the defendant liable for the
victim's death because someone other than the defendant caused the death).
120. Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga. 19, 20 (2004).
121. Flanders v. State, 279 Ga. 35, 39 (2005).
122. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(d) (2012).
123. See H.R. 7095, supra note 20; see also STEVEN D. WALDMAN, PAIN REVIEW 674-675 (2009); Ronald
L. Scott, Physicians' Obligation to Review Electronic Health Records Prior to Treatment, U. HousTON L.
CTR HEALTH L. PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 2006), available at
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2006/(RS)ObligationReviewEHR.pdf.
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and how taking and documenting these steps can help physicians avoid
both civil and criminal liability.
A. Approaches to Active Verification and Vigilance
When contemplating prescribing controlled substances, physicians
should first actively verify the suitability of such treatment and then
remain vigilant by continuously monitoring whether such treatment is still
appropriate. Physicians can meet these tasks in a number of different ways.
1. Approaches to Active Verification
Physicians should actively verify that their patients are suitable for
treatment with controlled substances to help comply with the medical
standard of care, and to meet the "legitimate medical purpose" and "usual
course of medical practice" prongs of the CSA test. For examples of tasks
used to actively verify, physicians can look to Florida Statute § 456.44,
which imposes a legal duty on physicians to meet certain "standards of
practice."'2 4 Florida's mandatory standards of practice include (1)
completing a medical history and physical examination before beginning
any treatment and documenting such medical record; (2) developing an
individualized treatment plan for each patient that states objectives to be
used to determine treatment success; and (3) changing treatment for
patients with signs or symptoms of substance abuse.125
Physicians can also satisfy this method of active verification in other
ways. For instance, a physician can verify that the patient has a disorder
that calls for treatment with controlled substances and that the patient tried
other treatments, such as taking non-controlled substance medications or
attending therapy sessions, before resorting to controlled substances.126 A
physician can also verify by speaking with other physicians who treated
the patient in the past,127 by reviewing reports of the patient's medical
history,128 and by utilizing prescription monitoring programs ("PMPs").129
124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.44 (2011); H.R. 7095, 113th Cong. (2011).
125. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.44 (2011).
126. The American Academy of Pain Medicine adopted a joint consensus statement on guidelines for
prescribing controlled substances. It states that physicians must consider alternative treatment methods
before prescribing controlled substances. J. David Haddox, Legal and Clinical Issues in Prescribing
Controlled Substances, 6 CANCER CONTROL JOURNAL 1 (1999), available at
http://moffittcancercenter.com/moffittapps/ccj/v6ns/article7.htm.
127. See, e.g., Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Chronic Pain, AZ. STATE MED. BD.,
available at http://www.azmd.gov/statutes-rules/7_policy.aspx (stating that physicians must conduct an
evaluation before prescribing controlled substances, which includes "corroboration of medical history by
reviewing patient's medical records and/or speaking with patient's former physicians").
128. Id.
129. PMPs are electronic databases that function as depositories for information about controlled
2013] 109
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Physicians can use PMPs to identify factual circumstances that suggest
prescription drug diversion,"o abuse, or addiction."' At the onset of
treatment, a physician can check the state PMP before prescribing a
controlled substance.'3 2 Physicians must always obtain informed consent
from the patient before beginning any treatment.133
Physicians can also verify through drug testing, which is an objective
clinical tool used to assess whether patients are taking prescribed
medications, taking the prescribed dosage, taking unauthorized controlled
medications, using illicit substances, or taking combinations of
medications and illicit substances that may induce adverse drug
interactions at any given point in time.'34 Drug testing usually includes
both a preliminary screening test and a confirmatory test to ensure
accuracy, reliability, and specificity."'
Taking all of these measures into account, the physician can then
make an informed decision as to whether treatment using controlled
substances is appropriate for the patient based on an individual, case-by-
case assessment. If the physician determines that the patient may not be
able to comply with the physician's usage instructions or has a past history
of abuse, the physician must adjust treatment in order to avoid foreseeable
harm to the patient.136 This method can be scaled up or down, at the
substances. U.S. Dep't. Justice, State Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY: OFF. DIVERSION CONTROL (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/rx_monitor.htm.
130. Some believe that a physician's duty is solely to the patient rather than society, and therefore, do not
have a duty to prevent diversion. See, e.g., Victor R. Fuchs, The Doctor's Dilemma-What is
"Appropriate" Care?, 365 N. ENGL. J. MED. 585-7, (Aug. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMpl107283. However, this is not true. Pursuant to the CSA,
physicians have a duty to both protect the patients' health and safeguard society against diversion of
controlled substances. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.71(a) (2006).
131. Ctr. for Disease Control &Prevention, Policy Impact: Prescription Painkiller Overdoses, (Nov. 29,
2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/rxbrief/.
132. Barth L. Wilsey, et al., Prescription Opioid Abuse in the Emergency Department, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 770, 772, 775 (2005) (stating that patients taking controlled substances require monitoring, and
examinations "must be supplemented with toxicology screening in order to detect the true incidence of
prescription drug abuse").
133. See U. Mich. Health System, Example Clinical Policy, Clinic Policy Regarding Patients on Long-
Term Controlled Substances, available at
http://www.med.umich.edu/1info/FHP/practiceguides/pain/policy.pdf
134. Leavitt & Reisfield, supra note 27 (also noting that such tests are useful because patients are expected
to test positive for prescribed medications that otherwise might be considered substances of abuse and to
test negative for non-prescribed controlled medications and illicit drugs).
135. Id.
136. Alfred V. Anderson, et al., Opioid Prescribing: Clinical Tools and Risk Management Strategies,
MN.GOV, 5 (Dec. 31, 2009), available at
http://mn.gov/health-licensing-boards/images/OpioidPrescribingClinical
ToolsandRiskManagementStrategies.pdf (stating that physicians must recognize aberrant controlled
substance-related behaviors and "formulate a differential diagnosis to identify, prevent, or treat medication
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prescriber's discretion, according to the anticipated risk. Physicians should
also properly document every tool they use while practicing the method of
active verification so that they may later use such documentation as
evidence of their legitimate efforts to prevent foreseeable harm, should
harm ultimately result. By utilizing these approaches, the physician may
be able to meet his duty under civil law, the CSA, and state homicide
statutes by actively verifying that the patient is suitable for treatment using
controlled substances.
2. Approaches for Vigilance
Active verification is only the first step; physicians also should
remain vigilant in order to reduce the risk of diversion, misuse, and
abuse' of controlled substances under civil law, the CSA, and homicide
laws. This means that once the physician has determined that treatment
with controlled substances is suitable, he must continue to monitor the
patient in order to ensure that such treatment remains suitable, and if the
patient shows signs of risk, the physician must change the treatment.
Physicians can do this by taking certain steps, which may include
requiring follow-up appointments periodically to assess the efficacy of
treatment and consider adverse drug effects; and requiring monitoring of
medication usage by performing drug tests and checking the PMP to
ensure patient compliance."'
If a physician discovers that the patient has begun to abuse the
medication or determines that treatment using controlled substances is no
longer suitable for the patient, then he must change the course of treatment
in order to prevent foreseeable harm to the patient.' The physician should
properly document the steps he has taken to change the course of treatment
in order to protect himself should harm ultimately arise. By remaining
vigilant throughout the patient's course of treatment, the physician is more
misuse, abuse, and inadequate treatment").
137. Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Policy Impact: Prescription Painkiller Overdoses (Nov. 29,
2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/rxbrief/. Misuse is distinguishable from
abuse. Abuse, as defined above, is "the intentional self-administration of a medication for a nonmedical
purpose such as 'getting high."' In contrast, misuse is "the use of medication for a medical purpose other
than as directed or indicated, whether willful or unintentional, and whether harm results or not. Misusing
medications includes behaviors such as self-medicating without a prescription, using the medication for
another indication than that for which it was prescribed, and increasing the dose of a prescribed
medication." See also Ctr. for Lawful Access & Abuse Deterrence, National Prescription Drug Abuse
Prevention Strategy, (2010), available at http://claad.org/downloads/2010_NationalStrategy.pdf.
138. H.R. 7095, 113th Cong. (2011)
139. Leavitt & Reisfield, supra note 27 (noting that courts usually find that routine testing is a standard of
responsible practice, also noting that all major federal guidelines for Kentucky, New York, and Washington
state that physicians should use drug tests when prescribing controlled substances).
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likely to meet his duty under civil law, the CSA, and state homicide
statutes because he is truly making a legitimate effort to prevent
foreseeable harm.
B. Active Verification and Vigilance to Prevent Civil and Criminal
Liability
This section discusses the rationale for why active verification and
vigilance will protect physicians from liability.
1. Meeting the Physicians' Duty Under Civil Law: Medical
Customs Test
As discussed above, when determining whether a certain practice is
customary in the medical community, proponents of evidence will offer
expert testimony to establish validity under the five-part Daubert test.140
Active verification and vigilance meet this test. Although such methods
can sometimes be subjective or imprecise, various members of the medical
community have tested and deemed the technique of active verification
and vigilance valid through the use of scientific studies.14' Additionally,
multiple peers in the medical community have reviewed the technique of
active verification and vigilance, have published articles in various
scientific journals, and have acknowledged that such techniques are
accepted by the scientific community.'42 They have also been established
as standards in clinical guidelines.143 In fact, fifteen states have adopted the
140. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (holding that factors establishing
validity include (1) whether the technique has been tested and deemed valid, (2) whether it has been
submitted for peer review or publication, (3) whether it has been accepted in the scientific community, (4)
whether standards were circulated to govem the operation of the theory or technique, and (5) whether the
potential rate of error involved is known.).
141. See, e.g., R.C. Robinson, et al., Screening for Problematic Prescription Opioid Use, 17 CLINICAL J.
PAIN 220-8 (2001) (providing empirical research on screening for problematic controlled substance
behavior).
142. See, e.g., Guideline for the Use of Chronic Opioid Therapy in Chronic Noncancer Pain, Evidence
Review, AM. PAIN SOC'Y, available at
http://www.americanpainsociety.org/uploads/pdfs/OpioidFinalEvidenceReport.pdf.; M.L. Fleming et
al., PSY50 Prescription Monitoring Programs' Utilization, 14 VALUE HEALTH A68 (2011); N. Katz et al.,
(944): Survey of Current Prescription Monitoring Programs: Update and Future Trends, 8 J. PAIN S87
(2007); David E. Joranson, et al., Pain Management and Prescription Monitoring, 23 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 231-8 (2002); Donna G. Benedict, Walking the Tightrope: Chronic Pain and Substance Abuse, 4 J.
NURSE PRACTITIONERS 604-9 (2008) (providing prescribing guidelines for chronic opiate therapy
consistent with the methods to comply with duty to actively verify and remain vigilant).
143. Fed'n of State Med. Bds. of the U.S., Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the
Treatment of Pain, FED'N STATE MED. BDS. U.S. (May 2, 1998), available at
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2004_gpol controlledsubstances.pdf (stating that "physicians should monitor
patient compliance in medication usage and related treatment plans"). In May 2012, the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration published its first guide to clinical drug testing in primary care.
See also Substance Abuse & Mental Health Serv. Admin., Clinical Drug Testing in Primary Care (2012),
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Federation of State Medical Boards "Model Guidelines for the Use of
Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain."l44 The guidelines
include approaches consistent with the method of active verification and
vigilance, such as evaluating patients' medical history to determine
suitability; developing treatment plans; periodically reviewing the course
of treatment and the patients' compliance with such plan; and adjusting
treatment if patients show signs of abuse.'4 5 Additionally, the error rates of
certain active verification and vigilance techniques are known.146
Therefore, active verification that a patient is suitable for treatment with
controlled substances and remaining vigilant throughout the course of
treatment is consistent with the medical customs test established in
Daubert.'47
2. Meeting the Physicians' Duty Under Civil Law: Reasonable,
Prudent Physician Test
Under the reasonable, prudent physician test, physicians must act
with the caution that a reasonable physician in similar circumstances
would exercise in providing care to prevent harm to a patient.148 It is
reasonable and prudent for a physician to actively verify patient suitability
for controlled substances before treatment and remain vigilant throughout
the course of treatment because controlled substances are dangerous by
nature, requiring additional caution when prescribing. By actively
verifying and remaining vigilant, a physician can avoid improperly
prescribing controlled substances to a patient with a history of abuse, and
the physician can detect abuse if the patient develops dangerous habits.
Therefore, active verification and vigilance can help a physician prevent
patient overdoses and other harm, which is consistent with the reasonable,
prudent physician test.
3. Meeting the Physicians' Duty Under The CSA
Moreover, physicians should actively verify and remain vigilant to
meet the requirements of the CSA. As discussed above, physicians
available at http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMAl2-4668/SMAl2-4668.pdf.
144. State-by-State Opioid Prescribing Policies, supra note 21.
145. See, e.g., David E. Joranson, et al., Pain Management and Prescription Monitoring, 23 J. PAIN &
SYMPTOM MGMT. 231-8 (2002); see also State-by-State Opioid Prescribing Policies, supra note 21.
146. See, e.g., L.R. Webster, et al., Predicting Aberrant Behaviors in Opioid-Treated Patients: Preliminary
Validation of the Opioid Risk Tool, 6 PAIN MED. 432-442 (2005) (providing statistics on the accuracy of
screening tools that predict which individuals may develop aberrant behavior when prescribed controlled
substances).
147. See supra Part I.B.; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
148. Strauss & Thomas, supra note 56.
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prescribing controlled substances must not knowingly and intentionally
prescribe controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose or
outside the usual course of medical practice under the CSA.149 Actively
verifying the suitability of treatment with controlled substances and
remaining vigilant prevents the physician from acting "without a
legitimate medical purpose," because it requires the physician to verify
whether the patient has a need for the prescription and to act accordingly.
It prevents a physician from acting "outside the usual course of medical
practice" because it requires the physician to verify whether a controlled
substance prescription is appropriate for the patient, to periodically verify
that the patient is not using the prescription improperly, and to change the
course of treatment if the patient exhibits dangerous behaviors. Failure to
actively verify and remain vigilant may result in criminal liability under
the CSA.so In fact, one study identified thirty-two cases in which federal
and state prosecutors found that physicians were prescribing controlled
substance outside the usual course of medical care, sometimes simply for
writing prescriptions to patients who then diverted the medication.''
Therefore, physicians should actively verify a patient's suitability for
controlled substances before beginning treatment and remain vigilant
throughout the course of treatment to better comply with the CSA.
4. Meeting the Physicians' Duty Under State Statutes
Active verification and vigilance, and, in particular, certain
approaches of which physicians can use to comply with this method, are
explicit in some states' controlled substance acts and implicit in others.
For example, Delaware, Nevada, New York, and Tennessee have statutes
that explicitly state that physicians must check the PMP before prescribing
controlled substances.'52 Kentucky and Tennessee also require physicians
to check the PMP at monthly intervals to ensure that patients who have
been prescribed controlled substances are properly refilling their
149. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 829 (2006); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 196-7 (9th Cir. 1975)
(holding that the phrases "in the usual course of professional practice" and "legitimate medical purpose"
have the same meaning); Moore, 423 U.S. at 141-2; Rosenberg, 515 F.2d at 193; Hellman, supra note 79.
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); see also Rosenberg, 515 F.2d at 193; see also David L. Robinson,
Bridging the Gaps: Improved Legislation to Prohibit the Abuse of Prescription Drugs in Virginia, 9
APPALACHIAN J. L. 281, 294 (2010); see also Steven Dubovsky, Big Brother May Be Watching What You
Prescribe, J. WATCH PSYCHIATRY, (2007) (stating that physicians prescribing controlled substances must
"document a careful history, examination, and treatment plan; schedule appropriate follow-up visits; and
resist patients' pressures to prescribe risky medications" in order to comply with the requirements of the
CSA).
151. Dubovsky, supra note 150.
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4798(e)(2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.23507 (2012); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
L. § 3343-a(2) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10-310 (2012).
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prescriptions in compliance with instructions and are not "doctor-
shopping."'13 Other states, such as Kentucky and Ohio in addition to
Delaware and Nevada require physicians to check the PMPs when they
believe that patients are seeking controlled substances for reasons other
than treatment of existing medical conditions, therefore ensuring
legitimate medical need before prescribing.154 Arizona, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont require all licensed prescribers and
dispensers to register with, but not necessary use, the PMP database.'
Additionally, the Boards of Medicine in Florida, New York, and
various other states have issued legislative guidelines that instruct
physicians to create treatment plans, perform drug tests, and engage in
periodic review of patients who are prescribed controlled substances.'
Although such guidelines are not mandatory, the Boards will consider such
guidelines when they make determinations at physician hearings.'
Louisiana, New Jersey, and Massachusetts require physicians to
schedule check-ups every six weeks, three months, and six months,
respectively, in order to assess the appropriateness of controlled substance
treatment.' Eighteen states require physicians to obtain patients'
informed consent before prescribing controlled substances.' Iowa
requires physicians to adopt effective treatment plans, engage in periodic
reviews and consultations, and terminate pharmacotherapy if necessary.'6 0
As such, physicians are required to take steps to actively verify and remain
vigilant under many state-controlled substances acts.''
153. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.172(2) (2012) (requiring practitioners to review the PMP no less than
once every three months for all available data on patients prescribed controlled substances); TENN. COMP.
R. & REGS. § 1200-34-01-.07(1)(a)(7) (2012) (requiring health care providers to access and review patient
information in the PMP upon each new admission and once every six months thereafter).
154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4798(12)(e) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.172(1) (2012);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.23507(A) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.11 (West 2012). See also States
that Require all Licensed Prescribers and/or Dispensers to Register with PMP Database, NAT'L ALLIANCE
FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS (2012), available at
http://www.namsdl.org/documents/StatesthatRequirePractitionerstoRegisterorHaveAccesstoPMPO7312012.
pdf (Providing a list of the rest of the states that require physicians to check the PMPs in certain situations).
155. States that Require all Licensed Prescribers and/or Dispensers to Register with PMP Database, supra
note 154.
156. FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. 64B8-9.013 (2010); Leavitt & Reisfield, supra note 27.
157. FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. 64B8-9.013 (2010).
158. State-by-State Opioid Prescribing Policies, supra note 21.
159. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia. Id.
160. Id
161. Although the website is limited to opioids, rather than all controlled substances, Medscape provides a
state-by-state summary of prescriber requirements consistent with and containing many tools used in the
method of active verification and vigilance. State-by-State Opioid Prescribing Policies, supra note 21.
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5. Meeting the Physicians' Duty Under State Homicide Statutes
Physicians must actively verify and remain vigilant under state
homicide statutes as well. As mentioned above, involuntary manslaughter
is an unintentional, unlawful killing with gross negligence, a disregard for
human life, or indifference to consequences.62
Second-degree murder is an unlawful killing in which the defendant
knowingly and intentionally commits an act dangerous to human life with
appreciation of the risk.'63 The element of "knowledge" is imputed on
every physician who prescribes controlled substances. As defined by the
CSA and adopted by many state-controlled substance acts,'64 controlled
substances have high potential for abuse."' Such medications can lead to
severe psychological or physical dependence and have limited medical
uses.'66 For that reason, the DEA requires physicians who plan to prescribe
controlled substances to register before doing so,' 7 and certain states
require additional education and training before the physicians can
prescribe controlled substances.'68 Given the extent of the prescription
drug epidemic and present-day resources available for prescriber
education, physicians cannot legitimately claim that they are unaware of
the risk of death to patients for whom they prescribe controlled substances.
Therefore, involuntary manslaughter is no longer the most appropriate
charge in controlled substance homicide cases. With knowledge of the
dangers of controlled substances, if a physician does not actively verify
patient suitability for controlled substances and remain vigilant throughout
treatment, the physician is acting with conscious disregard and can be
charged with second-degree murder.'69
First-degree murder includes felony-murder, or a death caused while
the defendant was in the commission of the felony, irrespective of
malice.'70 In a few states, it is a felony for physicians to dispense,
prescribe, or administer controlled substances outside the scope of
162. Developments in California Homicide Law, supra note 102, at 1443-4.
163. See supra Part II.C.2.
164. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 893.02 (2012); PA. CODE § 25.72(c) (2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.033(c) (West 2012).
165. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006).
166. Id.
167. 21 U.S.C. § 822 (2006).
168. These states include: Delaware, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Utah. Nat'l Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, States that Require Authorized Users to
Undergo Training for Use ofPMP, (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.namsdl.org/documents/StatesthatRequireAuthorizedUserstoUndergoTraining09112012.pdf.
169. See People v. Cravens, 53 Cal. 4th 500, 512-3 (2012) (defining "conscious disregard").
170. FLA. REV. STAT. § 782.04 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-l(c) (2012).
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practice, similar to the CSA test."' If a physician improperly prescribes a
controlled substance, and such behavior results in his patient's overdose-
related death, then he can be found guilty of felony-murder. However, if
the physician actively verifies and remains vigilant, he will be complying
with the medical standard of care and can prevent patient overdoses and
the resultant felony-murder charges.
Therefore, physicians must actively verify and remain vigilant to
prevent and interrupt risky behavior in their patients who they treat with
controlled substances. By practicing and properly documenting steps to
actively verify and remain vigilant, physicians likely can satisfy the
medical standard of care and avoid liability under the CSA, state-
controlled substance acts, and state homicide statutes.
IV. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO ACTIVELY VERIFY
AND REMAIN VIGILANT
As shown above, physicians can face civil liability if they improperly
prescribe controlled substances without actively verifying and remaining
vigilant.'72 To further illustrate this fact and to point out defenses that are
no longer viable in light of evolving case law regarding medical practice,
this Part provides cases in which physicians have and have not been held
liable for improperly prescribing controlled substances. It shows how
physicians who actively verify and remain vigilant have not been held
liable, and physicians who typically exhibit a pattern of failing to practice
such technique have been held liable.
One such case is Taglieri v. Moss."' In Taglieri, the New Jersey
Superior Court affirmed a lower court's partial summary judgment that a
physician was civilly liable for his patient's abuse of controlled
substances.174 The plaintiff in Taglieri alleged that his former physician,
Dr. Albert Moss, was the proximate cause of his prescription drug
addiction."' Dr. Moss began treating the plaintiff with oxycodone and
carisoprodol after a laminectomy failed to cure the patient of chronic back
pain.'76 In order to facilitate prescription refills, Dr. Moss gave the plaintiff
171. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-41 (2010).
172. See Final Order, In re: Jon Porter, MD., STATE OF VT. BD. MED. PRACTICE, available at
http://healthvermont.gov/hc/med-board/documents/FinalOrderl.4.12.pdf (clearing Dr. Jon Porter of
unprofessional document stemming from his Physician Assistant overprescribing controlled substances).
173. Taglieri v. Moss, 842 A.2d 280 (N.J. Super. 2004).
174. Id. at 289.
175. Id. at 283.
176. Id.
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post-dated and undated prescriptions."' Dr. Moss testified that he
"provided prescriptions for a larger supply to accommodate [the plaintiff],
for whom it was difficult to make frequent trips to the doctor's office."'
Despite Dr. Moss's testimony that he believed his prescribing behavior
was acceptable, the court found that, by so prescribing, Dr. Moss violated
the reasonable, prudent physician test for the medical standard of care.7 9
The court took note of the fact that Dr. Moss only saw the plaintiff once
every three months,'" despite the New Jersey law that forbids a physician
from prescribing Schedule II controlled substances in more than a thirty-
day supply, with limited exceptions, one of which being a requirement that
the physician must evaluate the patient's continued need for the
prescription at least every thirty days.'
This suggests that the court felt Dr. Moss had provided inadequate
oversight of the plaintiffs prescription medication use. Dr. Moss had
breached the standard of care by failing to actively verify patient
suitability for controlled substances before prescribing such medication
and to remain vigilant throughout the course of treatment because he had
not taken steps to ensure that treatment with controlled substances was still
appropriate for his patient. As a result, his good faith defense failed.
In Argus v. Scheppegrell,'8 2 a Louisiana court upheld a finding that
Dr. William Scheppegrell violated his duty of care by prescribing
controlled substances to a patient for weight control.' The 18-year-old
patient was 5'6" tall and weighed ninety-seven pounds.184 Yet, Dr.
Scheppegrell continued to prescribe the medication in increased dosages
even after the patient's mother informed him that the patient had become
addicted.'18 As a result, the patient died of an overdose. The court found
that Dr. Scheppegrell's prescribing was the proximate cause of the
patient's death, stating that Dr. Scheppegrell had blatantly disregarded his
duty of care.'18 Dr. Scheppegrell defended by claiming that the patient was
contributorily negligent, but the court held that the patient's negligence
could not be both a foreseen risk that imposes a duty on the physician and,
at the same time, a defense to an action for damages for breach of that
177. Id. at 282-3.
178. Id. at 284.
179. Taglieri, 842 A.2d at 286.
180. Id. at 284.
181. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:35-7.6(c) (2004).
182. Argust v. Scheppegrell, 472 So.2d 573 (La. 1985).
183. Id. at 574.
184. Id
185. Id.
186. Id. at 576-77.
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duty."' Thus, contributory negligence was not a valid defense,'8 8 and
active verification of the patient's suitability for controlled substances
before prescribing them and vigilance throughout the course of treatment
on the part of Dr. Scheppegrell could have prevented the death of his
patient.
In Ballenger v. Crowell,'" a North Carolina court also held that
contributory negligence was not a valid defense.' There, a physician
breached his duty of care by continuing to prescribe controlled substances
to a patient who had developed an addiction and died from an overdose."'
The court held that the fact that a patient becomes addicted to a
medication, continues treatment under the physician's care, and the patient
knowingly continues her addiction will not make her contributorily
negligent unless the patient does something wrong or unless the patient
knows her doctor is negligent.'9 2 Here, the plaintiff believed she would be
addicted for the rest of her life because the defendant physician told her
so.'" Therefore, neither wrongful conduct nor knowledge of the
physician's negligence was present, and the court ruled that the fact that
the plaintiff knew she was an addict and actively sought the medication
did not make her contributorily negligent.194
In contrast, in Posner v. Walker,'95 a Florida court threw out a jury
verdict that a physician had negligently caused a patient's death from
overdose.' 96 The court went on to enter judgment in favor of the
physician."' In Posner, the court described the great lengths to which the
physician, Dr. Ira Posner, had gone in order to wean the patient off of
controlled substances.'98 Dr. Posner suggested that the patient seek
alternative pain management. 99 Additionally, over the years, he treated the
patient with a variety of approaches, including anti-inflammatories,
physical therapy, steroid injections, non-opioid medications, and
surgery.2 00 The court noted that the patient failed to tell Dr. Posner that she
187. Id. at 577.
188. Id.
189. Ballenger v. Crowell, 247 S.E.2d 287 (N.C. App. 1978).
190. Id at 291.
191. Id. at 293.
192. Id. at 294.
193. Id. at 291.
194. Id. at 291-2.
195. Posner v. Walker, 930 So. 2d 659 (Fla. App. 2006).
196. Id. at 668.
197. Id
198. Id at 665-6.
199. Id at 665.
200. Id
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had met with other physicians and received prescriptions while Dr. Posner
was treating her.201 When Dr. Posner discovered other physicians were also
prescribing the patient medications, he asked them to stop. 202 Dr. Posner
also had the patient meet with a pain management team that included
himself and multiple other specialists, and he denied her more medicine
until she agreed to detoxification.203
In contrast to Judge Pastor who sentenced Dr. Murray in Michael
Jackson's death, as discussed below,204 the court in Posner was willing to
shift responsibility from Dr. Posner to the patient.205 Unlike Dr. Murray,
Dr. Posner had tried nearly every available treatment, from physical
therapy and injections to biofeedback and anti-inflammatory medications,
to control his patient's pain and wean her off of pain medications. 206 The
court was sympathetic to Dr. Posner, noting that, "[a]s a physician, Dr.
Posner [could not] make his patients do exactly as he tells them." 207 Dr.
Posner had remained active and vigilant, and as a result, he was not found
liable.
Therefore, physicians must assert and document efforts to verify
patient suitability for controlled substances before prescribing them and
remaining vigilant throughout the course of treatment to avoid civil
liability, as Dr. Posner did. They cannot rely on certain defenses, such as
good faith and contributory negligence, but complying with this method
can help protect physicians from liability.
V. HOMICIDE CHARGES FOR FAILURE TO ACTIVELY
VERIFY AND REMAIN VIGILANT
Civil law, which is aimed at compensating the victim, sometimes
does not go far enough when a physician could have prevented a patient's
controlled substance-related death through active verification and
vigilance. 20 8 First and foremost, the victim has already died, making the
survivor's civil proceeding too little and too late. Physicians also carry
medical malpractice insurance, covering costs that they may incur from
civil liability and obstructing much of the deterrent effect that litigation
201. Posner, 930 So. 2d at 667.
202. Id. at 666.
203. Id.
204. See supra Part V.B.1.a.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Sawicki, supra note 47 (noting civil law is aimed at victim compensation and criminal law is aimed at
punishing wrongdoers).
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may have. 209 The decedent's survivors may be compensated, but the
physician may continue the same dangerous acts that he had committed in
the past. 210 The case of People v. Tseng2" exemplifies this point. In People
v. Tseng, which is discussed at length below, 2 12 five separate families sued
Dr. Tseng for wrongful death after their family members died from
overdoses. 2 13 Dr. Tseng settled with all five families and continued her
dangerous prescribing practices, which caused an additional seven
deaths.214 The civil suits did not deter her.
Criminal proceedings, which are specifically aimed at punishing the
wrongdoer and preventing repeat offenses, 215 are sometimes necessary. In
recent years, courts increasingly have been willing to find physicians
criminally liable when a patient dies due to controlled substance overdose
and the physician had prescribed the fatal medication.2 16 In fact, the DEA
has reported a steady rise in successful criminal prosecutions of
physicians, from just fifteen convictions in 2003 to forty-three in 2008.217
Physicians can avoid homicide charges through active verification
and vigilance. For instance, it is an absolute defense to both civil and
criminal liability for improper prescribing or dispensing in West Virginia
if a physician makes a good faith reliance on the information contained in
the PMP database when he prescribed or refused to prescribe a controlled
substance.2 18 Yet, by failing to actively verify patient suitability for
controlled substances and remain vigilant thereafter, a physician exposes
himself to homicide charges. 219
This Part discusses federal and state criminal cases in depth. It
focuses on states that have been particularly aggressive in prosecuting
209. See Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Alternatives to Damage Caps, 26 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 413, 431 (2006) (noting that under the current system, "the deterrent effect of the tort system is
blunted by malpractice insurance").
210. See id ("Although there is some deterrent effect in the loss of reputation associated with a
malpractice claim, the majority of the deterrence, primarily economic cost, is absorbed by the insurance
company.").
211. People v. Tseng, (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2012, No. 394495) (pending).
212. See infra Part V.B.2.
213. Hernandez, supra note 49.
214. Id.; AP Staff Writer, CA Doctor Ordered to Trial in 3 Drug Deaths, THE EXAMINER (June 26, 2012),
available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/ca-doctor-ordered-to-trial-in-3-drug-deaths/article/feed/
2006561#.UD5x
T8FISXs (noting that prosecution offered testimony about a total of twelve of Tseng's patients who died of
drug overdoses, although the prosecution only brought charges for three of those deaths).
215. Hernandez, supra note 213; CA Doctor Ordered to Trial in 3 Drug Deaths, supra note 216.
216. Trachtman, supra note 23.
217. Id.
218. W. VA. CODER. § 60A-9-5(g) (2012).
219. See supra Part III.B.
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physicians for improperly prescribing controlled substances repeatedly or
to extreme levels. It also establishes that physicians may be able to avoid
criminal liability through active verification and vigilance.
A. Federal Controlled Substances Act Cases
At the federal level, prosecutors frequently charge physicians for
crimes under the CSA.220 Successful federal prosecutions have paved the
way for state prosecutors to become more aggressive and to do away with
the "good faith" defense. This section discusses some of those federal
cases.
Moore v. United StateS221 was groundbreaking for the prosecution of
physicians under the CSA. There, the United States Supreme Court held
that physicians "can be prosecuted [for improperly prescribing controlled
substances despite being licensed and registered to do so] when their
activities fall outside the usual course of professional practice."222 The
Court found Dr. Moore guilty of knowingly and unlawfully distributing
and dispensing a controlled substance because Dr. Moore prescribed
medication in large quantities to patients at their requests, in the requested
amount, and at a price based on the number of pills. 2 3
Since Moore, lower courts have struggled with defining what
physician conduct falls in or out of "the usual course of professional
practice" in improper prescribing cases.224 Moore provided little guidance
on this issue because the case involved a physician who abdicated all
professional responsibility.225 The Court further complicated matters by
upholding the lower court's jury instructions that, for a guilty verdict, the
jury had to conclude that the defendant physician had prescribed the
medications "other than in good faith," making good faith an element of
the liability test for the first time.2 26 Later courts held that a jury instruction
220. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 971 (2006).
221. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
222. Moore, 423 U.S. at 124.
223. Diane E. Hoffman, New Perspectives on Familiar Issue: Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion
and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 231, 282 (2008).
224. Robinson, supra note 150, at 294 (stating that "defining the bounds of 'legitimate' medical practice is
a subjectively vague and somewhat obscure concept, which inevitably results in vast amounts of physician
discretion").
225. Moore, 423 U.S. at 125-6.
226. Id. at 138-9 stating:
The trial judge assumed that a physician's activities are authorized only if they are within the
usual course of professional practice. He instructed the jury that it had to find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that a physician, who knowingly or intentionally, did dispense or distribute
[methadone] by prescription, did so other than in good faith for detoxification in the usual
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to determine whether a physician had acted in good faith was sufficient to
guide the jury in finding whether a physician had the "intent to act as a
pusher rather than a medical professional." 227
In United States v. Feingold,228 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of a physician for the unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance under the CSA. 229 The government indicted Dr. Jeffrey Feingold
on 185 counts of illegal distribution of controlled substances, including
diazepam, hydrocodone, oxycodone, and oxycodone with
paracetamol/acetaminophen. 23 0 Dr. Feingold authorized refills of his
prescriptions at rapid rates, sometimes within a day or two. 231' Two
undercover DEA agents visited Dr. Feingold, posing as patients.232 Dr.
Feingold prescribed controlled substances to both, without even examining
the agent-patients.233
In his defense, Dr. Feingold argued that he was "merely an
incompetent doctor" that had always prescribed medications in good faith
and had genuinely, if naively, believed patients when they requested
pills.2 34 He explained his excessive prescription-writing as a lack of
training, in both managing opioid medications and in identifying opioid
seekers, but that he always prescribed in the genuine belief that such
medication was necessary to treat his patients' legitimate and serious
medical conditions.235 However, the court explained that good faith was
not merely having good intentions towards a patient, but "an honest effort
to prescribe for a patient's condition in accordance with the standard of
medical practice generally recognized and accepted in the country. 236
Dr. Feingold argued that he lacked the proper mens rea, or guilty
mind. The court noted that, to find a physician guilty under the CSA, a
practitioner must act with intent to distribute controlled substances outside
course of a professional practice and in accordance with a standard of medical practice gen-
erally recognized and accepted in the United States.
227. United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006).
228. Id. at 1001.
229. Id at 1013. The CSA makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute or
dispense a controlled substance without proper authorization. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Furthermore, a
prescription for a controlled substance is only allowed if it is "issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice." 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)
(2006). In Moore, the Supreme Court held that a physician who prescribes outside of the usual course of his
professional practice is subject to criminal liability. Moore, 423 U.S. at 124.
230. Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1004-5.
231. Id at 1005.
232. Id
233. Id
234. Id at 1006.
235. Id at 1005.
236. Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1006.
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the course of professional practice, acting as a "pusher rather than a
medical professional." 2 37 And although Dr. Feingold argued that he was
simply an incompetent physician who honestly tried to help his patients
manage their pain, the court still found that he had the requisite intent,
upholding the conviction.2 38 The court noted that he prescribed drugs "to
people whom he knew to be addicts, to people whom he never examined,
to people whom he never met, and to undercover law enforcement
officials" who essentially told him they wanted narcotics, and he dispensed
controlled substances in extreme. 239 He did not determine whether such
patients had a legitimate medical need, and if so, whether they were
suitable for treatment with controlled substances. Nor did he remain
vigilant throughout the course of treatment to ensure patients were
properly using their medications, instead choosing to act outside the usual
course of medical practice, and as a result, the court affirmed his
convictions.
In the same year that the Ninth Circuit decided Feingold, the Fourth
Circuit decided United States v. Hurwitz2 40 and United States v. McIver241
under the CSA. Dr. William Hurwitz, a physician who operated a pain
clinic in Virginia, managed pain with controversially high doses of various
opioid medications, including methadone, oxycodone, and
hydromorphone.2 42 After several of Dr. Hurwitz's patients were arrested
for attempting to sell prescription drugs, they cooperated with federal
investigators and identified Hurwitz as the source of such medication.2 43 A
jury convicted Dr. Hurwitz of "50 counts of illegal drug distribution,
including conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and charges
related to drug trafficking that resulted in one death and serious bodily
injury to others." 24 Dr. Hurwitz received a sentence of twenty-five years
in prison.245
Dr. Hurwitz appealed the district court's decision, in part because
Judge Leonard Wexler barred the jury from considering whether Dr.
Hurwitz had prescribed the medications in good faith in their verdict
237. Id. at 1008.
238. Id. at 1010.
239. Id. at 1005.
240. United States v. Horowitz, 459 F.3d 463 (4th 2006).
241. United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550 (4th 2006).
242. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 466.
243. Id. at 466-7.
244. News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Virginia Pain Doctor Sentenced to 25 Years (2005),
available at http://crime.about.com/od/drugwar/a/dea050420.htm.
245. Id.
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determination.246 Dr. Hurwitz argued that, despite the controversy of his
treatment plans, they had a valid medical purpose. 247 Dr. Hurwitz later
suggested that a small segment of his patients had taken advantage of his
practice.24 He argued that problems arose because he was ill-equipped to
deal with drug-seeking patients.249
The government argued that Dr. Hurwitz's treatment plans were
outside the usual course of professional practice, even for physicians who
provide high-dose opioid therapy. 250 An expert for the prosecution testified
that high-dose therapy generally entailed about 200 milligrams of
morphine a day to a patient.251 In contrast, Dr. Hurwitz prescribed a
median of 2,000 milligrams of morphine or its equivalent a day to his
individual patients.252
The Fourth Circuit held that the jury should have been able to
consider whether Dr. Hurwitz prescribed in good faith.' It vacated Dr.
Hurwitz's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.254 At his
second trial, on July 13, 2007, the jury convicted Dr. Hurwitz on sixteen
counts of drug trafficking.255 U.S. District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema
sentenced Dr. Hurwitz to less than five years, a substantial reduction from
his vacated twenty-five year sentence.256 In her ruling, Judge Brinkema
indicated that she believed Dr. Hurwitz had helped more patients than he
had harmed.257 In fact, one patient testified that Dr. Hurwitz's treatments
allowed her to regain her life and live in considerably less pain.258 Judge
Brinkema concluded that "the mere prescription of huge quantities of
opioids [did not necessarily] mean anything."2 59 Moreover, she did not find
Dr. Hurwitz's high dose therapy to be outside the usual course of practice,
246. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 466.
247. Id.
248. Jerry Markon, Va. Pain Doctor's Prison Term Is Cut to 57 Months, WASH. POST (July 14, 2007),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/13/AR2007071301035.html.
249. Id
250. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 467.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 481-2.
254. Id. at 482.
255. Markon, supra note 248.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 468.
259. John Tierny, A Win for Dr. Hurwitz, a Loss for the Pill-Counters, NY TIMES (July 13, 2007),
available at
http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/a-win-for-dr-hurwitz-a-loss-for-the-pill-counters.
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noting that "an increasing body of respectable medical literature and
expertise supports those types of high-dosage, opioid medications."2 60
The court also held that although good faith generally is relevant
when determining whether a physician violated the CSA, the district court
had not erred by refusing to allow Hurwitz to present the injury with
instructions to find him not guilty if he subjectively acted in good faith.26 '
The court noted that "allowing criminal liability to turn on whether the
defendant-doctor complied with his own idiosyncratic view of proper
medical practices" is inconsistent with prior case law.262 It went on to say
that "to permit a practitioner to substitute his or her views of what is good
medical practice for standards generally recognized and accepted in the
United States would be to weaken the enforcement of our drug laws in a
critical area." As such, Hurwitz received a multi-year prison sentence.2 63
Thus, physicians should follow standards generally recognized and
accepted in the medical community when prescribing controlled
substances. The approaches to active verification and vigilance
summarized in Part III, section A above will likely satisfy this
requirement.
In McIver, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Dr. Ronald
McIver.264 Dr. McIver operated a pain management clinic in South
Carolina and prescribed oxycodone, methadone, and morphine, among
other controlled substances, to his patients.265 Like Dr. Hurwitz, Dr.
McIver managed his patients' pain with high-dosage opioid therapy.266 The
court cited numerous ways that Dr. McIver's prescribing history did not
accord with the usual course of professional practice.267 For example, Dr.
McIver rarely offered non-drug pain therapy. 268 He also continued to
prescribe after he suspected patients were addicted.269 in one case, he
continued prescribing after finding a syringe in a patient's possession and
after the patient told Dr. McIver he only used the syringe for fishing.270
Interestingly, Dr. McIver had written to the South Carolina Health
260. Markon, supra note 248.
261. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 476-80.
262. Id. at 478.
263. Markon, supra note 248.
264. United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 565 (4th Cir. 2006).
265. Id. at 553, 557-8.
266. Tina Rosenberg, When is a Pain Doctor a Drug Pusher?, NY TIMES (Jun. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17pain-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that civil
cases are often filed after criminal charges).
267. McIver, 470 F.3d at 554.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 554-5.
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Department about his suspicions that the patient was selling his
prescription medication.271 However, given that Dr. McIver continued to
prescribe medications to the patient, and therefore, failed to be vigilant in
the course of treatment by changing his treatment methods, the court gave
little weight to Dr. McIver's letter.272
In United States v. Merrill,273 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
conviction of Dr. Thomas Merrill, after five of his patients died of drug
overdoses while under his care. 274 A jury had found Dr. Merrill guilty of a
litany of violations under the CSA, including four counts stating that the
deaths resulted from the use of the prescribed medications.275 The jury
rejected Dr. Merrill's argument that there was no way he could have
"foreseen the deaths of patients who did not follow proper dosage
instructions."" As shown above, physicians have imputed knowledge of
the dangers of prescribing controlled substances, so his patients' improper
usage should have been foreseeable. He also argued that his only fault was
that he trusted his patients too much.2 n Yet, trust alone is not appropriate.
A physician has a duty to do more than trust a patient; he must make a
legitimate effort or use best practices in an attempt to determine whether
the patient has an actual medical need for the controlled substance, and, if
so, that the patient properly uses it. It is never possible to be fully
confident that the patient is doing what the physician directed, but this
method protects the physician in addition to the patient. When properly
documented, it can show that the physician has taken appropriate steps to
avoid foreseeable harm.
Dr. Merrill appealed the jury's verdict, arguing, among other things,
that there had been insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him.278 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected a good faith standard of intent and instead
focused solely on whether the physician objectively acted in accordance
with the usual course of professional practice.279 The court found that there
had been sufficient evidence against Dr. Merrill to affirm the jury's
271. Id. at 555.
2 7 2. Id.
273. United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293 (1lth Cir. 2008).
274. Id. at 1309.
275. News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Florida Physician Sentenced To Life Imprisonment
On Drug And Fraud Charges Arising Out Of Improper Dispensing Of Controlled Substances (Jul. 11, 2006)
available at http://www.justice.gov/dealpubs/states/newsrel/mia071l06.html.
276. Melissa Nelson, Florida Doctor's OxyContin Trial Begins, Prosecutors Say Man Overprescribed
Painkiller, Causing Six Deaths, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, January 11, 2006, at P5C.
277. Id.
278. Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1298-9.
279. Id. at 1306.
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verdict.280 It noted that the evidence had shown that Dr. Merrill had written
multiple prescriptions for similar medications to the same patient during
one visit; performed few, if any, physical examinations; maintained poor
records of the medications he had prescribed patients; did not run any
toxicology screens; and ignored warnings from other medical
professionals that a patient was addicted to prescription medications.28'
Good faith was not a viable defense because, before prescribing, Dr.
Merrill failed to ensure that his patients had a legitimate medical need and
were suited for treatment involving controlled substances. After beginning
treatment, he failed to be vigilant.
B. State Cases
States throughout the country have increased their enforcement
efforts in order to curb prescription drug abuse.282 In many of those states,
homicide cases are currently pending against physicians due to improper
prescribing of controlled substances.283 This section focuses on cases from
aggressive states such as California, Florida, Georgia, and Nevada.
1. California
Over the past decade, California courtrooms have hosted some of the
most highly publicized homicide trials of physicians who improperly
prescribed controlled substances. This section focuses on cases from
aggressive states such as California, Florida, Georgia, and Nevada.
a. People v. Murray
Dr. Conrad Murray met pop icon Michael Jackson in 2006, when he
treated Jackson and his children for the flu.284 In the spring of 2009,
Jackson asked Dr. Murray to serve as his personal physician during a
280. Id. at 1297-8.
2 8 1. Id.
282. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 15; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.181-481.186
(West 2012) (stating inspections, evidence, and miscellaneous law enforcement provisions).
283. See, e.g., Ihosvani Rodriguez, 'Pill Mill'Doctors Charged in Deaths of Nine Patients, SUN SENTINEL,
(Jul. 20, 2012), available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-07-20/news/fl-pill-mill-doctors-
indictments-2-20120720_1_oxycodone-pills-pill-mill-doctors-pain-pills (charging two Florida physicians
for the deaths of nine patients); see also Sheila Stogsdill, Doctor Charged in Drug Overdose, TULSA
WORLD, July 10, 2012, at A12 (charging a Oklahoma physician with second-degree manslaughter for the
death of a nursing instructor who died from a prescription drug overdose). These are just a few of the many
criminal charges against physicians in July and August of 2012.
284. Nick Allen, Conrad Murray: Cardiologist Whose Incompetence Turned Him into Michael Jackson
Killer, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/michael-
jackson/8867887/Conrad-Murray-cardiologist-whose-incompetence-tumed-him-into-Michael-Jackson-
killer.html.
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series of concerts in England, and Dr. Murray subsequently started treating
Jackson for insomnia.285 On June 25, 2009, Jackson died of cardiac
arrest. 286 Later, forensic tests revealed that a drug overdose caused the
cardiac arrest.2 87 The Los Angeles County Coroner named the cause of
death as "acute propofol intoxication" and "intravenous injection by
another." 288
Propofol is a powerful medication, most often given to surgical
patients as a sedative.289 While propofol produces a sleep-like loss of
consciousness, the anesthetic's effect is actually closer to a coma.290 FDA-
approved labeling provides that propofol "should be administered only by
persons trained in the administration of general anesthesia."291
Dr. Murray administered propofol, among other prescription
medications, to Jackson on a nightly basis over the course of two months,
in an effort to treat Jackson's insomnia.292 Dr. Murray had become
concerned that Jackson had grown dependent on propofol to sleep. Yet, on
June 25, 2009, after administering doses of diazepam, lorazepam, and
midazolam 293 to Jackson, who still could not fall asleep, Murray reluctantly
acquiesced to Jackson's requests and once again administered propofol.294
Shortly thereafter, Jackson was non-responsive and later pronounced
dead.295 Los Angeles County District Attorney Steve Cooley subsequently
charged Dr. Murray with involuntary manslaughter.296
The court instructed the jury to find Dr. Murray guilty of involuntary
manslaughter if he "committed a lawful act but acted with criminal
negligence," and such act caused Jackson's death. 297 The court defined
285. See Duke, supra note 1.
286. Id.
287. See Michael Jackson's Amended Death Certificate, supra note 1.
288. Id.
289. The DEA has issued a proposed rule to place propofol into schedule IV of the CSA. 21 C.F.R. § 1308
(2010).
290. Matthew Edlund, M.D., Comas Don't Count as Sleep, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Oct. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-rest/2011 10/comas-dont-count-sleep.
291. Federal Drug Admin., Diprivan (propofol) Injectable Emulsion, 14 (2008), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda docs/label/2008/019627s0461bl.pdf(FDA labeling for Propofol).
292. Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2.
293. Diazepam, lorazepam, and midazolam are all controlled substances found in schedule IV. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Controlled Substances-Alphabetical Order, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.: OFF. DIVERSION
CONTROL, (Apr. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/c_csalpha.pdf.
294. See Transcript of Recorded Interview of Conrad Murray, at 42, 82, People v. Murray, (Super. Ct. L.A.
County, 2009, No. 073614).
295. Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2.
296. John M. Curtis, Opening Statements in Dr. Conrad Murray Trial, EXAMINER (Sept. 27, 2011),
available at http://www.examiner.com/article/opening-statements-dr-conrad-murray-trial.
297. Jury Instructions, supra note 2, at 7.
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"criminal negligence" as a reckless action "that creates a high risk of death
or great bodily injury and a reasonable person would have known that
acting in that way would create such a risk."298 It further instructed the jury
that the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter based upon
the theory of criminal negligence stemming from the failure to perform a
legal duty.299 It explained that a physician "who assumed the responsibility
to treat and care for a patient has a legal duty to treat and care for that
patient," and that a physician fails to perform a legal duty if he causes the
patient's death.300 The death must be the direct, natural, and probable
consequence of the act or the failure to perform a legal duty, and the death
would not have happened without the act or the failure to perform a legal
duty."301
The court found that Murray acted with an extreme callousness for
Jackson's safety and with a strong disregard for the risk of death, rather
than with due caution.302 Murray breached the standard of care simply by
treating Jackson's insomnia with propofol.303 The prosecution called expert
witnesses to testify on the standard of care in the medical community.304
One such witness, Dr. Nader Kamangar, testified that Dr. Murray's
treatment of Jackson's insomnia with propofol was "beyond
comprehension" and "disturbing." 30" The court found that Murray "had
repeatedly subjected Jackson to a dangerous, unprecedented
pharmaceutical experiment" by administering propofol on a nightly basis
for over two months, in addition to benzodiazepines; that Murray failed to
provide the proper monitoring equipment or additional personnel that
would have been able to save Michael Jackson's life; and that Murray
personally failed to monitor Jackson.306 Thus, Dr. Murray breached his
duty of care by failing to determine whether Jackson was suited for
treatment using propofol. The jury found Murray guilty of involuntary
manslaughter on November 7, 2011.307
Superior Court Judge Michael Pastor found Dr. Murray's treatment
of Jackson's insomnia with propofol to be outside the bounds of the
298. Id
299. Id.
300. Id. at 7-8.
301. Id.
302. Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2.
303. Id.
304. Linda Deutsch, Sleep Expert: Drugs Caused Michael Jackson's Death, CNSNEWS.COM (Oct. 14,
2011), available at http://cnsnews.com/news/article/sleep-expert-drugs-caused-michael-jacksons-death.
305. Id.
306. Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2, at 4.
307 Id
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standard of care, calling it "experimental." 0 Dr. Murray had defended
himself by claiming that Jackson engaged in doctor-shopping.309 Judge
Pastor rejected the defense's "criminal contributory negligence" argument
that Jackson should bear responsibility for his own death because he
sought prescription medications."o Even so, it was no excuse because Dr.
Murray could have consulted with Jackson's previous physicians, could
have used the state's PMPs, could have drug tested Jackson, or, as Judge
Pastor noted, could have "walked away and said 'no' as countless [other
physicians] did.""3 1  As a result of this lack of verification of the
appropriateness of the treatment, Judge Pastor sentenced Dr. Murray to
four years in prison without probation, the maximum possible sentence.3 12
b. People v. Tseng
At a conference following Dr. Murray's conviction, a member of the
press asked District Attorney Cooley whether "he had filed the case just
because the alleged victim was Michael Jackson."3 13 Cooley said no,
indicating that Jackson's celebrity status did nothing more than raise the
media interest in the case.314 Given the relative rarity of homicide charges
against prescribing physicians, some may have been skeptical; however, in
March 2012, Cooley charged Dr. Lisa Tseng with second-degree
murder.3 15 Following her arrest, Cooley made his position clear, releasing a
statement that noted that "prescription drug overdose deaths have reached
epidemic proportions" and "[e]nough is enough. Doctors are not above the
law."' 16
The DEA began to investigate Dr. Tseng in 2007.3 " During a three-
year investigation, the DEA found that Dr. Tseng had written an average
of twenty-five prescriptions a day.' Additionally, an L.A. Times
investigation in 2010 linked Dr. Tseng to eight patient deaths.319 Federal
308. Id
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2, at 4.
313. Martin Kasindorf, Jackson Fans, Family See Justice in Doctor's Guilty Verdict, USA TODAY (Nov. 8,
2011), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-11-04/michael-jackson-doctor-trial-verdict/51113244/1.
314. Id.
315. Deutsch & Risling, supra note 9.
316. The War on Pill Mills, supra note 9; see also Dahl, supra note 10.
317. Girion et al., Doctor Charged in Fatal Prescription Overdoses, LA TIMES, (Mar. 1, 2012), available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/01/localla-me-drug-doctor-20120302.
318. Deutsch & Risling, supra note 9.
319. Girion, supra note 317.
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prosecutors considered charging Dr. Tseng under a federal drug-dealing
statute.320 However, in the end, federal prosecutors left Dr. Tseng's case in
the hands of Cooley.321 Cooley subsequently charged Dr. Tseng for the
deaths of three of her patients-Joey Rovero, Vu Nguyen, and Steven
Ogle.322 In addition, Cooley charged Dr. Tseng with twenty-one other
felony counts for prescribing controlled substances, such as oxycodone
and alprazolam, without a medical purpose.323
Cooley's choice of second-degree murder rather than involuntary
manslaughter, of which Dr. Murray had been convicted, was a bold
decision. Not only had few physicians been convicted of second-degree
charges, but also a second-degree murder conviction in California carries a
much heavier sentence.3 24 An involuntary manslaughter conviction carries
a maximum sentence of four years.3 25 In contrast, a second-degree murder
conviction carries a minimum of fifteen years.
Cooley charged Dr. Tseng under a different theory than that under
which he charged Dr. Murray. Cooley charged Dr. Murray under the
theory that Dr. Murray had been criminally negligent in his administration
of controlled substances to Jackson.327 Cooley charged Dr. Tseng under the
theory of implied malice.328 In Dr. Tseng's case, malice could be implied
because Dr. Tseng knew some of her other patients had died from
overdoses.3 29 Therefore, she should have known that her prescriptions were
potentially deadly.330 Yet, she did not alter her prescribing approaches.331
Following a preliminary hearing, Superior Court Judge M.L. Villar
de Longoria decided that Dr. Tseng would indeed stand trial for the
murders of Rovero, Nguyen, and Ogle.332 The gravity of the charges,
combined with the rarity of attempting to hold a physician criminally
liable for the death of a patient, undoubtedly contributed to the extensive
320. Id.
321. Id
322. Branson-Potts, supra note 7.
323. Deutsch, supra note 48.
324. Beth Karas, Should Conrad Murray be on Trial for Murder?, CNN.coM (Oct. 17, 2011), available at
http://insession.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/17/should-conrad-murray-be-on-trial-for-murder.
325. CAL. PENAL CODE § 193(c) (West 2012).
326. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(b) (West 2012).
327. Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2, at 4.
328. Deutsch & Risling, supra note 9.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Linda Deutsch, California Doctor Ordered to Trial on Second-Degree Murder Charges in 3 Drug
Overdose Deaths, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 26, 2012), available at
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/trial-decision-due-ca-doctor-drug-deaths.
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nature of the preliminary hearing.333 Over a three-week period, forty
witnesses testified, including "members of law enforcement, the coroner's
office, former staff members at Tseng's clinic, expert witnesses, former
patients and family members of patients."33 4 The prosecution also
presented over 100 pieces of evidence.335 Witnesses testified that Dr.
Tseng prescribed them controlled substances with very little examination
or, in some cases, with no examination at all."'
One of the patients who died under Dr. Tseng's care was Joey
Rovero, a 21-year-old college student.337 Dr. Tseng prescribed Rovero
oxycodone, alprazolam, and carisoprodol after he came to her office
complaining of a sore wrist and feelings of anxiousness.33 8 Dr. Tseng did
not identify which wrist was bothering Rovero, nor did she probe why
Rovero was feeling anxious.339 Rovero later died "from a mixture of
alcohol and moderate to trace levels" of the drugs that Dr. Tseng had
prescribed to him.340 She did not actively verify that the use of controlled
substances was appropriate for him. Nor did she try an alternative
approach to treatment with controlled substances first, even though she
could have simply prescribed aspirin for his sore wrist.
In order to establish implied malice, the prosecution asserted that Dr.
Tseng had ample notice that her prescribing methods were dangerous,
given that three other patients had died of overdoses during 2007 and
2008.341 Moreover, the prosecution argued that Dr. Tseng received notice
through other means.342 For example, one patient's father had called Dr.
Tseng in 2010 and implored her to stop writing prescriptions for his son.343
According to the defense, Dr. Tseng wrote each prescription in good
faith and for the purpose of helping her patients cope with their pain.3" Dr.
Tseng's five-attorney team tried to shift the blame from Dr. Tseng to her
3 3 3. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Melanie C. Johnson, Witness Says Rowland Heights Doctor Gave Her Hundreds of Pills, DIAMOND
BAR PATCH (June 16, 2012), available at
http://diamondbar.patch.com/articles/witness-says-rowland-heights-doctor-gave-her-hundred-of-pills.
337. Deutsch & Risling, supra note 9.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Deutsch, supra note 332.
342. See Hailey Branson-Potts, Former Addicts: Doctor Charged with Murder Was Easy Mark for Drugs,
L.A. TIMEs (Jun. 14, 2012), available at
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/06/doctor-rowland-heights-murder-charges-drugs.html.
343. Id.
344. Deutsch, supra note 332.
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patients. 345 For instance, on cross-examination of one of Dr. Tseng's
patients, who served as a witness for the prosecution, the defense pressed
the patient to admit that she was aware she was addicted to controlled
substances and was abusing the prescriptions Dr. Tseng wrote for her.346
Some patients acknowledged that they mixed their medications with
alcohol.3 47 Dr. Tseng's defense argued that Dr. Tseng could not know
which patients were abusing drugs, nor could she be blamed if patients did
not follow her dosing instructions.348 Dr. Tseng stated that if a "patient
decides to take a month's supply in a day, then there's nothing I can do
about that."349 Yet, Dr. Tseng could have taken steps to actively verify
patient suitability for controlled substances before prescribing them, and
then remained vigilant throughout the course of treatment. She could have
tried treatments using non-controlled substances first. She could have
checked California's PMP to determine whether her patients were doctor
shopping to divert or abuse medications.350 Periodic urinalysis tests could
have alerted her to disqualifying conditions, such as alcohol use, addiction,
and non-compliance with dosage instructions.
In deciding that Dr. Tseng would stand trial for murder, Judge Villar
de Longoria accepted the prosecution's theory of implied malice.351 During
his ruling, Judge Villar de Longoria said, "[Dr. Tseng] continued to
prescribe these narcotics in high doses even after she was told something
was terribly wrong and young men were overdosing and dying."352 He
made particular note of the high number of patients who died of overdoses
while under her care.
Dr. Tseng was arraigned on August 7, 2012, where she pleaded not
guilty to three counts of second-degree murder, one felony count of
prescribing drugs using fraud, and twenty felony counts of prescribing
drugs without a legitimate purpose.354 If convicted, she faces a maximum
prison term of forty-five years to life."5
345. See Hernandez, supra note 213.
346. Id.
347. Deutsch, supra note 332.
348. Id
349. Deutsch & Risling, supra note 9.
350. See Off. of Attorney Gen., Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES),
California Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) (2013), available at
http://oag.ca.gov/cures-pdmp.
351. Id.
352. Id
353. Id.
354. Arraignment Set for Doctor Charged in 3 Overdose Deaths, KTLA.COM (Aug. 7, 2012), available at
http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-rowland-heights-doctor-arrested,0,2086189.story.
355. Id
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c. People v. Fisher
Dr. Frank Fisher operated a California pain clinic from 1995 to
1999.351 In February 1999, Dr. Fisher was arrested and charged with
prescribing excessive amounts of controlled substances and five counts of
first-degree murder based on the prescription overdoses of his patients.357
Prosecutors claimed that Dr. Fisher overprescribed pain medications such
as oxycodone, causing five overdose deaths, that he ran a drug mill, and
that he was billing for treating patients with no legitimate medical need."'
The charges were later reduced to involuntary manslaughter due to
inadequate evidence.359 At trial, the prosecution mainly argued that Dr.
Fisher was the largest prescriber of Oxycontin in the state.36 o In his
defense, Dr. Fisher showed that he adhered to the accepted standards of
care, fulfilling the duty of the active verification of patient suitability for
controlled substances before prescribing them and vigilance throughout
the course of treatment by providing the following treatment:
* Rigorous pre-treatment screening to exclude potential abusers
of pain medications;
* Mandatory mental health evaluations of all chronic pain
patients by a licensed professional;
* Ejection of patients caught lying, diverting medication, or
ingesting non-therapeutic doses; and
* Regular and frequent blood and urine testing for medication
serum levels, as well as for illegal substances. 361
These steps established that Dr. Fisher had abided by the standard of
care. The court acquitted Dr. Fisher of all charges, and four wrongful death
suits that were brought against him were all dismissed. The case
highlighted the importance of establishing active verification and vigilance
as an effective defense for physicians.3 62
356. Hoffman, supra note 19 at 225.
357. Id.; see also Steve Geissinger, Physician is Charged with Manslaughter, SAN DIEGO SOURCE (Aug.
14, 1999), http://www.sddt.com/News/article.cfm?SourceCode=19990816cn#.UY-yDbWsiSo.
358. Geissinger, supra note 357.
359. Hoffman, supra note 19 at 239-40.
360. Id. at 240.
361. Id.
362. Id. This case highlights an important problem-physicians who follow the verification and vigilance
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2. Florida
Florida, a state particularly impacted by the prescription drug
epidemic," currently has two cases pending in which physicians have
been charged with first-degree murder.364 In March 2010, Dr. Sergio
Rodriguez was indicted for three counts of first-degree murder for the
overdose deaths of three of his patients, and his trial is still pending.365 The
criminal complaint alleged that Dr. Rodriguez caused the deaths of his
patients "through the unlawful prescription of a controlled substance,
oxycodone, by means of prescription issued in bad faith and not in the
course of his professional practice."366 He knowingly distributed controlled
substances outside the scope of his professional medical practice without
legitimate medical purposes.367 Although Dr. Rodriguez operated a
pediatric office, he saw adult patients and prescribed them controlled
substances without examining them.
In August 2011, a state grand jury indicted Dr. Gerald Klein, a
physician who worked at a pain clinic, with first-degree murder, and his
trial is also currently pending. 369 Dr. Klein's patient died of a prescription
drug overdose after obtaining a single prescription from Dr. Klein for
more than 200 pills at one time without determining a legitimate medical
need.37 0 The patient died of combined drug toxicity the day after receiving
the prescription.3 1  Three board-certified pain management doctors all
agreed that no medical reason existed for Dr. Klein to prescribe such large
method may still end up on trial. Even if the result of the trial is a finding of no liability, which is more
likely for physicians who practice verification and vigilance, the mere fact the case is brought can damage a
physician's reputation, insurability, and finances. This problem could likely be reduced by ensuring that
prosecutors obtain adequate education and training on how to recognize dangerous prescribing practices
and when to refer such cases to licensing authorities versus pursuing them as criminal matters.
363. Florida Office of Drug Control, Florida's Prescription Drug Diversion and Abuse Roadmap 2012-
2015, available at
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/KGRG-8T8L5K/$file/PrescriptionDrugDiversionAndAbuse
Roadmap.pdf.
364. Dahl, supra note 10.
365. Deutsch & Risling, supra note 9; see also Michael LaForgia, Doctor Charged with Murder in
Overdose Deaths of3 Men, PALM BEACH POST, March 13, 2010, at IA.
366. Dahl, supra note 10.
367. FL Dep't of Law Enforcement, Palm Beach County Doctor Indicted on Murder Charges (Mar. 12,
2010), available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/News/March-2010/Palm-Beach-County-Doctor-
Indicted-on-Murder-Charge.aspx.
368. Staff Writer, Florida Doctor Charged with Murder in Overdose Deaths, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar.
12, 2012), available at http://www.ocala.com/article/20100312/articles/100319888?tc=ar.
369. Dahl, supra note 10; see also Michael LaForgia, Feds Hope to Crush Pill Czars, PALM BEACH POST,
August 24, 2011 at IA.
370. Dahl, supra note 10; see also Death on Owners' Hands, PALM BEACH POST, August 24, 2011 at 10A.
371. Dahl, supra note 10.
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doses of controlled substances.372 Dr. Klein's attorney told Circuit Judge
Joseph Marx that he plans to present evidence that the patient had been
doctor-shopping at the time of his death and ignored Dr. Klein's orders not
to take pills that a relative had given him, a defense that this Article has
shown will likely fail. 73
3. Georgia
Georgia is another state that has pursued murder charges in improper
prescribing cases.374 In Georgia, a physician can be charged with felony-
murder if the death of a patient results from controlled substance use.7
Felony-murder, as defined by Georgia law, occurs when the defendant
commits the offense of murder in the commission of a felony, and the
defendant causes the death of another human being irrespective of
malice.3 76 The sentence for felony-murder is life imprisonment or death.3 77
In Hulme v. State,378the court stated that felony-murder was appropriate in
controlled substance homicides:
In Georgia, although we have no controlled-substance homicide
statute, a person may be convicted of felony murder in this State
when, in the commission of a felony, he causes the death of
another human being irrespective of malice. The only limitation
on the type of felony that may serve as an underlying felony for
a felony murder conviction is that the felony must be inherently
dangerous to human life. For a felony to be considered
inherently dangerous, it must be dangerous per se or it must by
its circumstances create[ ] a foreseeable risk of death. 7 1
In Chua v. State,so the jury found the defendant-physician guilty of
not only violating Georgia's controlled substances act, but of felony-
murder.3"' In Chua, the patient died of an overdose of a mixture of
controlled substances, including morphine, oxycodone, and methadone,
372. Death on Owners' Hands, supra note 370.
373. Daphne Duret, Bail Set for Pain Clinic Doctor in Murder Trial, PALM BEACH POST, September 3,
2011 at IB.
374. See id; Alvarez, supra note 15.
375. Hulme v. State, 544 S.E.2d 138, 140-11 (Ga. 2001); see also Chua v. State, 710 S.E.2d 540 (Ga.
2011).
376. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (2012).
377. Id.
378. Hulme, 544 S.E.2d at 138.
379. Id. at 140-11.
380. Chua, 710 S.E.2d at 540.
381. Id.
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which Dr. Noel Chua had prescribed.3 82 Dr. Chua had prescribed
oxycodone on November 28, 2005 and then distributed methadone to the
patient days later on December 9 and December 12, 2005.383 Dr. Chua had
obtained the patient's previous medical records, which showed a pattern of
prescription drug abuse, but failed to adjust the patient's treatment plan,
therefore failing to verify the appropriateness of treatment with controlled
substances and to remain vigilant to prevent foreseeable patient harm.384
Dr. Chua also ignored a nurse who warned him that the patient had an
addiction, and he continued to provide the patient with controlled
substance prescriptions, again failing to act after learning facts that
typically necessitate a change in the treatment plan. 3 s The defense argued
that Dr. Chua treated the patient in the usual course of practice, and that
the pain medications were necessary to help relieve the patient's chronic
pain and headaches.8 In affirming Dr. Chua's conviction, the court
stressed Dr. Chua's inaction despite evidence that the patient was addicted
to prescription medications.8
When prescribing controlled substances, verifying the patient's
history to ensure the patient's suitability for treatment with controlled
substances is vital, but is not enough; a physician must also be vigilant and
change the course of treatment when the physician finds out that treatment
using controlled substances is not appropriate for the patient.
4. Nevada
In Nevada, a physician may be convicted of first-degree or second-
degree murder, if "the death of a person was proximately caused by a
controlled substance which was sold, given, traded, or otherwise made
available to him."' Depending on whether the prosecutor decides to
charge the physician with first-degree or second-degree murder, the
physician can receive a minimum sentence of twenty-five years in prison
and a maximum sentence of the death penalty.389
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id
386. Teresa Stepzinksi, Chua Murder Conviction Upheld by Georgia Supreme Court, FLORIDA TIMES
(May 31, 2011), available at
http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2011-05-31 /story/chua-murder-conviction-upheld-georgia-supreme-
court.
387. Chua, 710 S.E.2d at 544.
388. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.333 (2012).
389. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.030, 453.333 (2012).
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In 2011, Dr. Richard Teh was arrested, pursuant to this statute, on a
second-degree murder charge for prescribing "inappropriate doses" of
schedule II-IV controlled substances to a patient who subsequently died.390
Although the prosecution charged Dr. Teh with acting with malice
aforethought, 391' Dr. Teh's attorney argued that Dr. Teh never intended to
harm the patient by prescribing the pain medication. 392 He further stated,
"there was no malice, no intent to kill," and yet, prosecutors were willing
to bring the charge anyway."' However, the prosecutors ultimately
dropped the case when the coroner's office changed its ruling on the cause
of death.394
In 2008, a Nevada jury convicted Dr. Harriston Bass of second-
degree murder395 along with forty-nine counts of selling a controlled
substance and nine counts of possession with the intent to sell, after one of
his patients died from taking hydrocodone prescribed to her by Dr. Bass.396
Dr. Bass ran a mobile medical service called "Docs 24-7," through which
he made house calls to patients at their homes and hotel rooms.' His car
was outfitted with a portable refrigerator that he used as his mobile
pharmacy.398 Although he was not certified as a pharmacist and was not
authorized to sell or dispense controlled substances, Dr. Bass routinely
dispensed the medications for money.399 The prosecution had accused Dr.
Bass of selling the decedent 900 hydrocodone pills. 400  However, only
trace amounts of the medication were found in the decedent's toxicology
report, suggesting the decedent was diverting the medications. 4 0 ' The
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and a sentence of twenty-
five years to life.402
390. Criminal Complaint at 1, Nevada v. Teh, (Super. Ct. Clark County, 2011, No. 1 1F03617X). (charging
Dr. Teh with violating Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.010, 200.030, 453.333 for selling, giving, trading, or
otherwise making available controlled substances to the patient with malice aforethought); see also Paul
Harasim & Mike Blasky, Murder Charge Upsets Doctors, LAS VEGAS R.J., Apr. 3, 2011, at IB.
391. Criminal Complaint, supra note 390, at 1.
392. Harasim & Blasky, supra note 390.
393. Criminal Complaint, supra note 390, at 1.
394. Francis McCabe, Murder Charge Against Doctor to be Dropped, Memo Shows, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,
Apr. 3, 2011, at 3B (changing the case of death to pneumonia rather than an overdose).
395. Second-degree murder in Nevada is almost anything besides a "willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing." NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (2012).
396. Ed Vogel, Justices Uphold Doctor's Conviction in Overdose Death, LAS VEGAS R. J., (May 19,
2010), available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/justices-uphold-doctors-conviction-overdose-
death.
397. Harasim & Blasky, supra note 390.
398. Id
399. Vogel, supra note 396.
400. Id
401. Id.
402. Harasim & Blasky, supra note 390.
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C. What Do These Cases Tell Physicians?
There are a few common threads in these cases. Mainly, they
demonstrate the defenses on which physicians can no longer rely in light
of the need to actively verify a patient's suitability for controlled
substances before beginning treatment and to remain vigilant throughout
the course of treatment. This section provides a discussion of such
defenses. Additionally, please see Table 1 for a list of defenses and cases
in which such defenses have been rejected.
1. The Good Faith Defense
As established in Tseng, Feingold, Hurwitz, and Merrill, physicians
cannot rely on the good faith defense, in which a defendant argues that he
prescribed based on his belief that such prescription was appropriate, to
protect themselves against criminal liability.403 Although a patient may
have a condition that can be treated with controlled substances, the
physician must determine that the patient has a legitimate medical need for
treatment with controlled substances rather than another type of treatment.
When a physician simply prescribes controlled substances without
verifying that the patient is suited for such treatment, he may have good
intent, but mere intention likely will not save him from liability based on
the imputed knowledge of the dangers of prescribing controlled
substances.
2. Willful Ignorance and Calculated Risk
Good faith standards may encourage "willful ignorance," which
occurs when a physician continues to prescribe, despite his awareness of a
number of red flags, as in the cases of Dr. Tseng and Dr. Chua.404 The
physician deliberately avoids learning the facts that, if known, would
require the physician to change his prescribing actions.405
It is questionable whether a physician could continue to prescribe
controlled substances despite his awareness of red flags, but still act in
good faith, especially because courts have looked unfavorably at
physicians when they disregarded warnings.406However, defenders of such
conduct argue that physicians can use the "calculated risk" defense, in
which the physician believes that any benefit derived from the treatment,
403. See supra Part V.A-B.
404. Id.
405. See Hellman, supra note 79.
406. See, e.g., Chua, 710 S.E.2d at 540 (2011).
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such as cessation of pain, would outweigh negative consequences, such as
possibility of addiction to the controlled substance.407
This calculated risk argument is weak because proper medical
practice requires that the physician evaluate, manage, and, if necessary for
patient safety, respond to the risks of prescribing controlled substances. If
the physician takes steps to actively verify patient suitability for controlled
substances, he will have a greater likelihood of knowing, before writing
the first prescription, whether the patient could be seeking to divert or
abuse controlled substances.408For example, if the patient has a history of
abuse, the physician will know that the risk requires a specialized
approach to treatment.409 Even if the physician preliminarily determines
that the controlled substance is appropriate for the patient, if the physician
is properly following the calculated risk theory, then certain red flags, such
as PMP data or urinalysis results can alert him that the risk of the
controlled substance has begun to outweigh its benefit and that a different
method of treatment is now necessary.410
Moreover, the CSA test, which requires a physician to prescribe to
patients with a legitimate medical need and inside the course of usual
medical practice, prevents certain risk-taking.4 1' Many states require
physicians to undergo training pertaining to controlled substances to learn
what is within the usual course of medical practice.412 Other practices, such
as prescribing large dosages of controlled substances without properly
verifying the patient's suitability for the medication, as doctors Hurwitz,
McIver, and Merrill had done, violate the first part of the CSA test because
the physician has not determined whether the patient has a legitimate
medical need for such treatment. Risky practices, such as providing rapid
refills without knowledge of the patient's proper use of the medication, as
407. Id. (noting that "it isn't reckless to risk a harmful action, even if it is very likely to occur, if the harm
is significantly smaller than the harm that inaction may cause" and that a physician "is obligated to care
more about alleviating the suffering of his patient than he cares about avoiding harm to society").
408. See H.R. 7095, supra note 20; see also STEVEN D. WALDMAN, PAIN REV. 674-5 (2009); see also
Scott, supra note 123.
409. See Hellman, supra note 79.
410. See id.
411. See, e.g., Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1008; Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1309; People v. Tseng, (Super. Ct. L.A.
County, 2012, No. 394495).
412. These states include Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Utah. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1007 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.1545 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37f-402 (2012); Nat'l Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, Statutes that Require Certain Authorized
Users to Undergo Training and/or Completion of Educational Course Before Accessing PMP Data (2012),
available at http://www.namsdl.org/documents/StatesthatRequireAuthUserstoReceiveTrainingPriorto
AccessingPMPO7232012.pdf (noting that the state PMP representatives of Montana, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina all require all authorized users to complete a training program before
being granted access).
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Dr. Feingold had done, violate the second part of the CSA test because
such method is outside the usual course of medical practice.
Therefore, physicians should not rely on the willful ignorance or
calculated risk defenses even if they believe that using controlled
substances adequately treats their patients' symptoms, as doctors Chua,
Feingold, Hurwitz, McIver, Merrill, and Moore had attempted to do.413
3. Trusting the Patient
Similarly, trusting a patient is not enough to protect a physician
against criminal liability. Dr. Feingold, Dr. Merrill, and Dr. Tseng all
argued unsuccessfully that they simply trusted their patients to a fault.414
Yet, the courts still found them guilty.4 15 Although a physician's trust in
his patient is important to help the patient feel respected,416 physicians are
still required to determine whether their patients have a legitimate medical
need for treatment with controlled substances and to then prescribe within
the usual course of medical practice. Blindly accepting a patient's word
that he experiences sharp pains or strong headaches, as in Feingold,
Merrill, and Tseng, is not sufficient to prescribe controlled substances. A
physician must legitimately attempt to verify the need for such treatment
and ensure that such treatment is, and remains, necessary and appropriate.
However, with respect to active verification, a physician can never be
certain of such need because many disorders or symptoms of disorders for
which controlled substances are prescribed do not present significant
physical or measurable manifestations, and can only be assessed and
reported by the patient himself. Examples are pain, anxiety, and adult
Attention Deficit Disorder.
When active verification and vigilance are consistently carried out
when prescribing controlled substances, the stigma of not relying upon
trust alone is removed. Although some patients can find testing offensive
or intimidating, it is a practice that can help ensure a physician's
compliance with the standard of care.417 When a physician checks a PMP
or incorporates drug testing into treatment plans regardless of what the
patients say, the physician can rightly state that he is not taking such
actions because he does not believe his patients. Rather, the physician
413. See Hellman, supra note 79.
414. See supra Part V.A-B.
415. Id.
416. See Hellman, supra note 79.
417. Leavitt & Reisfield, supra note 27.
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takes these actions because he is required to do so for medical and legal
reasons.
4. Lacking Foreseeability
Lacking foreseeability is also no longer a valid defense. Dr. Tseng,
Dr. Murray, and Dr. Merrill all argued that they had no way to foresee
whether patients would follow the proper dosage instructions.418 The
foreseeability defense is similar to arguing contributory negligence. For
example, Dr. Murray defended that Jackson self-administered the propofol
when Dr. Murray had left the room.4 19 Dr. Murray also argued that he did
not know that, the night before Jackson's death, Jackson had taken other
medications that Dr. Murray prescribed.4 20 Yet, the courts found all of
these physicians liable regardless.42 1 Like contributory negligence, lack of
foreseeability is not a valid defense because the physicians have imputed
knowledge of the risks involved in prescribing controlled substances. They
become aware of this risk at the moment they are required to register with
the DEA to prescribe controlled substances, a step that alerts physicians to
the seriousness of prescribing such medication.
Additionally, lack of foreseeability is a weak argument because
physicians have methods of assessing the likelihood of adverse events at
their disposal, as discussed above. If they make efforts to verify patient
suitability for controlled substances and remain vigilant throughout the
course of treatment, they likely will be able to spot signs of diversion,
misuse, or abuse before it is too late. Therefore, unique risks associated
with each patient's controlled substance use are increasingly foreseeable.
5. Risky Prescribing
Risky prescribing without actively verifying patient suitability for
controlled substances and without remaining vigilant throughout the
course of treatment can result in a breach of duty under civil law, the CSA,
and state homicide statutes. Physicians can no longer rely on the defenses
of good faith,422 willful ignorance, 423 trusting the patient,424 calculated
418. See supra Part V.A-B.
419. See supra Part V.B.
420. Id.
421. See supra Part V.A-B.
422. Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1008; Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 466; Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1309; Deutsch, supra note
332 (discussing the rejection of Dr. Tseng's good faith defense).
423. See Chua, 710 S.E.2d at 544; Stepzinksi, supra note 386 (discussing how the court rejected Dr.
Chua's argument that he prescribed high dosages of controlled substances to properly treat his patient's
pain); Branson-Potts, supra note 342 (noting that Dr. Tseng ignored her patient's father when he told her
about his son's abuse of controlled substances).
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risk,4 25 or lack of foreseeability.4 26 Thus, as these defenses are not viable,
physicians who prescribe controlled substances without actively verifying
patient suitability for controlled substances before prescribing and
remaining vigilant throughout the course of treatment are more exposed
than ever to criminal liability.
CONCLUSION
Prescription drug abuse is a well-known and widespread epidemic.
When physicians claim that they do not know that controlled substances
are dangerous and perhaps deadly to their patients, it does not ring true.
Similar skepticism shrouds claims that they do not know what dosages
their patients are taking, that their patients had been doctor-shopping, or
that the patients had a history of controlled substance abuse. Physicians
must determine the appropriateness of prescribing controlled substances
through active verification and vigilance. When physicians fail to take
these steps, they are knowingly breaching the reasonable, prudent person
standard of care and the CSA test by placing their patients at risk of harm.
As such, breaching physicians can be charged with anything ranging from
a civil fine to first-degree murder. As case law evolves, physicians should
no longer rely on certain, long-standing defenses. Thus, if physicians
actively verify and remain vigilant, while properly documenting the tools
used to practice such method, they can improve their likelihood of
avoiding both civil and criminal liability at the federal and state levels.
More importantly, they can help protect their patients from unnecessary
and preventable adverse events, including death.
424. See Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1006; see supra note 277 and accompanying text; see supra note 345 and
accompanying text.
425. See Chua, 710 S.E.2d at 544; Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 466 (choosing to prescribe his patients high
dosages of controlled substances to treat their pain after obtaining the patients' medical records and being
told of patients' addictive behavior); Stepzinksi, supra note 387 (discussing how the court rejected Dr.
Chua's argument that he prescribed high dosages of controlled substances to properly treat his patient's
pain).
426. See Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1309; Nelson, supra note 276 (discussing how the court rejected Dr. Merrill's
foreseeability defense); Deutsch, supra note 332 (discussing the prosecution's rejection of Dr. Tseng's
foreseeability defense).
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TABLE 1
n DCases that rejected thisDefense Definitionsdefense
A state of mind denoting
honesty of purpose, freedom Taglieri v. Moss, United
States v. Tseng, Unitedfrom intention to defraud, States v. Feng, UnitedGood Faith adgnrlysekg, States v. Feingold, UnitedGood aith and generally speaking,
States v. Hurwitz, & United
means being faithful to one's
duty or obligation. 427  States v. Merrill
The act or omission
Contributory amounting to want of
Negligence / ordinary care on the part of Argus v. Scheppegrell,
"Criminal" the plaintiff, which, B a r People
Contributory concurring with the Mu ,P l
Negligence defendant's negligence, is the Tseng
proximate cause of 48ury.
Physician's reliance on the
Trusting the information that a patient United States v. Feingold,
Patient tells him without properly United States v. Merrill, &
verifying whether such United States v. Tseng
information is accurate.
A chance of failure or United States v. Chua,
success whose degree of United States v. Feingold,
Calculated probability has been United States v. Hurwitz,
Risk estimated before some United States v. McIver,
undertaking is entered United States v. Merrill, &
upon.429 United States v. Moore
Lack of reasonable United States v. Tseng,Lack of anticipation that harm or
Foreseeability injury is likely to result from
430 United States v. Dr. Merrillcertain acts or omissions.
427. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990).
428. Id. at 1033.
429. Calculated Risk Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/calculated%20risk.
430. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 428 at 649.
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